The command is used for injecting a secret into a guest memory region. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <[email protected]> Cc: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]> Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <[email protected]> --- arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 79 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c index 16b338d9dc87..dadfb8e15db9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c @@ -6392,6 +6392,81 @@ static int sev_dbg_encrypt(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) return sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, argp, false); } +static int sev_launch_secret(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) +{ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &kvm->arch.sev_info; + struct sev_data_launch_secret *data; + struct kvm_sev_launch_secret params; + struct page **pages; + void *blob, *hdr; + unsigned long n; + int ret; + + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) + return -ENOTTY; + + if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_launch_secret))) + return -EFAULT; + + /* verify that request has a valid guest memory region and length */ + if (!params.guest_uaddr || + !params.guest_len || + (params.guest_len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* pin the guest memory region */ + pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr, params.guest_len, &n, 1); + if (!pages) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* + * The secret must be copied into contiguous memory region, lets verify + * that pinned memory pages are contiguous otherwise fail the command. + */ + if (get_num_contig_pages(0, pages, n) != n) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto e_unpin_memory; + } + + ret = -ENOMEM; + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!data) + goto e_unpin_memory; + + /* copy the secret from userspace into a kernel buffer */ + blob = copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len); + if (IS_ERR(blob)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(blob); + goto e_free; + } + + data->trans_address = __psp_pa(blob); + data->trans_len = params.trans_len; + + /* copy the packet header from userspace into a kernel buffer */ + hdr = copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len); + if (IS_ERR(hdr)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(hdr); + goto e_free_blob; + } + data->trans_address = __psp_pa(blob); + data->trans_len = params.trans_len; + + data->handle = sev->handle; + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET, data, &argp->error); + + kfree(hdr); +e_free_blob: + kfree(blob); +e_free: + kfree(data); +e_unpin_memory: + sev_unpin_memory(kvm, pages, n); + + return ret; +} + static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; @@ -6435,6 +6510,10 @@ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) r = sev_dbg_encrypt(kvm, &sev_cmd); break; } + case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET: { + r = sev_launch_secret(kvm, &sev_cmd); + break; + } default: break; } -- 2.9.5
