Previously, the only capability effectively required to operate on the
/proc/scsi interface was CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE (or for some other files,
having an fsuid of GLOBAL_ROOT_UID was enough). This means that
semi-privileged processes could interfere with core components of a
system (such as causing a DoS by removing the underlying SCSI device of
the host's / mount).
Cc: <sta...@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebied...@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asa...@suse.de>
---
drivers/scsi/scsi_proc.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/scsi_proc.c b/drivers/scsi/scsi_proc.c
index 480a597b3877..486aedce2f05 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/scsi_proc.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/scsi_proc.c
@@ -51,7 +51,10 @@ static ssize_t proc_scsi_host_write(struct file *file, const
char __user *buf,
struct Scsi_Host *shost = PDE_DATA(file_inode(file));
ssize_t ret = -ENOMEM;
char *page;
-
+
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM
+
if (count > PROC_BLOCK_SIZE)
return -EOVERFLOW;
@@ -313,6 +316,9 @@ static ssize_t proc_scsi_write(struct file *file, const
char __user *buf,
char *buffer, *p;
int err;
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (!buf || length > PAGE_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
--
2.14.3
