> On Jan 15, 2018, at 9:50 AM, Nadav Amit <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
>> 
>> 
>>> On Jan 15, 2018, at 9:42 AM, Nadav Amit <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> 
>>>>> On Jan 14, 2018, at 12:13 PM, Nadav Amit <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> Currently, when page-table isolation is on to prevent the Meltdown bug
>>>>> (CVE-2017-5754), CR3 is always loaded on system-call and interrupt.
>>>>> 
>>>>> However, it appears that this is an unnecessary measure when programs
>>>>> run in compatibility mode. In this mode only 32-bit registers are
>>>>> available, which means that there *should* be no way for the CPU to
>>>>> access, even speculatively, memory that belongs to the kernel, which
>>>>> sits in high addresses.
>>>> 
>>>> You're assuming that TIF_IA32 prevents the execution of 64-bit code.  It 
>>>> doesn't.
>>>> 
>>>> I've occasionally considered adding an opt-in hardening mechanism to 
>>>> enforce 32-bit or 64-bit execution, but we don't have this now.
>>> 
>>> I noticed it doesn’t. I thought the removing/restoring the __USER_CS
>>> descriptor on context switch, based on TIF_IA32, would be enough.
>>> modify_ldt() always keeps the descriptor l-bit clear. I will review the
>>> other GDT descriptors, and if needed, create two GDTs. Let me know if I
>>> missed anything else.
>> 
>> There world need to be some opt-in control, I think, for CRIU if nothing 
>> else.
>> 
>> Also, on Xen PV, it's a complete nonstarter.  We don't have enough control 
>> over the GDT unless someone knows otherwise.  But there's no PTI on Xen PV 
>> either.
>> 
>>>> Anything like this would also need to spend on SMEP, I think -- the 
>>>> pseudo-SMEP granted by PTI is too valuable to give up on old boxes, I 
>>>> think.
>>> 
>>> If SMEP is not supported, compatibility mode would still require page-table
>>> isolation.
>>> 
>>> Thanks for the feedback. I still look for an ack for the basic idea of
>>> disabling page-table isolation on compatibility mode.
>> 
>> I'm still not really convinced this is worth it.  It will send a bad message 
>> and get people to run critical stuff compiled for 32-bit, which has its own 
>> downsides.
> 
> I can handle #GP gracefully if __USER_CS is loaded so PTI would be required
> again. Doing so would eliminate the need for an opt-in, and preserve the
> current semantics.
> 

Not if someone used LAR, a la the sigreturn_32 test.  Not necessarily a 
showstopper, though.

You'd also have to figure out how to do PTI per-thread, which Linus doesn't 
like.  See Willy's PTI opt-out thread.

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