From: Thomas Gleixner <t...@linutronix.de>
[peterz: comment]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <t...@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <pet...@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <d...@amazon.co.uk>
---
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 10 +++++++++-
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
index a156195..304de7d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
@@ -6,13 +6,14 @@
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/debugfs.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include <asm/cache.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
#include <asm/uv/uv.h>
-#include <linux/debugfs.h>
/*
* TLB flushing, formerly SMP-only
@@ -220,6 +221,13 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct
mm_struct *next,
u16 new_asid;
bool need_flush;
+ /*
+ * Avoid user/user BTB poisoning by flushing the branch
predictor
+ * when switching between processes. This stops one process from
+ * doing Spectre-v2 attacks on another.
+ */
+ indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK)) {
/*
* If our current stack is in vmalloc space and isn't
--
2.7.4
