4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Darren Kenny <darren.ke...@oracle.com>
(cherry picked from commit af189c95a371b59f493dbe0f50c0a09724868881)
Fixes: 117cc7a908c83 ("x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit")
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.ke...@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <t...@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.w...@oracle.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lenda...@amd.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <a...@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <b...@alien8.de>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhira...@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <ar...@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <d...@amazon.co.uk>
Link:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180202191220.blvgkgutojecx...@starbug-vm.ie.oracle.com
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <d...@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gre...@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
* On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest
* can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both
* retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future
- * CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided.
+ * CPUs with IBRS_ALL *might* it be avoided.
*/
static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
{
