3.2.101-rc1 review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.


From: Dan Williams <dan.j.willi...@intel.com>

commit edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360 upstream.

Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall' protections
in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling will allow the
kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for now, only claim
mitigation for __user pointer de-references.

Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jsl...@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.willi...@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <t...@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-a...@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-harden...@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gre...@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: torva...@linux-foundation.org
Cc: a...@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <b...@decadent.org.uk>
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct sysde
        if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1))
                return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
-       return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+       return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
 ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct sysdev_class *dev,

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