3.2.101-rc1 review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.


From: Darren Kenny <darren.ke...@oracle.com>

commit af189c95a371b59f493dbe0f50c0a09724868881 upstream.

Fixes: 117cc7a908c83 ("x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit")
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.ke...@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <t...@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.w...@oracle.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lenda...@amd.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <a...@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <b...@alien8.de>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhira...@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <ar...@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <d...@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <b...@decadent.org.uk>
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ extern char __indirect_thunk_size[];
  * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest
  * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both
  * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future
- * CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided.
+ * CPUs with IBRS_ALL *might* it be avoided.
 static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)

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