On Wed, Apr 04, 2018 at 04:30:18AM +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> What I'm afraid of is this turning into a "security" feature that ends up
> being circumvented in most scenarios where it's currently deployed - eg,
> module signatures are mostly worthless in the non-lockdown case because you
> can just grab the sig_enforce symbol address and then kexec a preamble that
> flips it back to N regardless of the kernel config.
Whoa. Why doesn't lockdown prevent kexec? Put another away, why
isn't this a problem for people who are fearful that Linux could be
used as part of a Windows boot virus in a Secure UEFI context?
If lockdown simply included a requirement for a signed kernel for
kexec --- and if kernel signing aren't available, to simply not alow
kexec, wouldn't that take care of this case?
This wouldn't even be all that much of a burden for non-distro users
with lockdown enabled, since in my experience outside of enterprise
and data center use cases, kexec isn't used --- and in fact, very
often kexec doesn't even work outside of a very carefully selected and
bug-fixed set of device drivers. (It often doesn't work in non-distro
kernels because very few upstream developers really care about kexec.)
- Ted
