resource can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to a
potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

kernel/sys.c:1474 __do_compat_sys_old_getrlimit() warn: potential
spectre issue 'get_current()->signal->rlim' (local cap)
kernel/sys.c:1455 __do_sys_old_getrlimit() warn: potential spectre issue
'get_current()->signal->rlim' (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing *resource* before using it to index
current->signal->rlim

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Cc: sta...@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gust...@embeddedor.com>
---
 kernel/sys.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 63ef036..78646e6 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -69,6 +69,9 @@
 #include <asm/io.h>
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
 
+/* Hardening for Spectre-v1 */
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+
 #include "uid16.h"
 
 #ifndef SET_UNALIGN_CTL
@@ -1451,6 +1454,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned int, resource,
        if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
                return -EINVAL;
 
+       resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS);
        task_lock(current->group_leader);
        x = current->signal->rlim[resource];
        task_unlock(current->group_leader);
@@ -1470,6 +1474,7 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned int, 
resource,
        if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
                return -EINVAL;
 
+       resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS);
        task_lock(current->group_leader);
        r = current->signal->rlim[resource];
        task_unlock(current->group_leader);
-- 
2.7.4

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