Mimi Zohar <[email protected]> writes: > In order for LSMs and IMA-appraisal to differentiate between the > original and new syscalls, both the original and new syscalls must call > an LSM hook. This patch adds a call to security_kernel_read_data() in > the original kexec syscall.
Until the lsm hook mess gets cleaned up. Nacked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]> > > Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]> > Cc: Eric Biederman <[email protected]> > Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <[email protected]> > Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]> > Cc: David Howells <[email protected]> > --- > kernel/kexec.c | 8 ++++++++ > 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c > index aed8fb2564b3..061ada41c18c 100644 > --- a/kernel/kexec.c > +++ b/kernel/kexec.c > @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ > #include <linux/capability.h> > #include <linux/mm.h> > #include <linux/file.h> > +#include <linux/security.h> > #include <linux/kexec.h> > #include <linux/mutex.h> > #include <linux/list.h> > @@ -195,10 +196,17 @@ static int do_kexec_load(unsigned long entry, unsigned > long nr_segments, > static inline int kexec_load_check(unsigned long nr_segments, > unsigned long flags) > { > + int result; > + > /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */ > if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled) > return -EPERM; > > + /* Permit LSMs and IMA to fail the kexec */ > + result = security_kernel_read_data(NULL, READING_KEXEC_IMAGE); > + if (result < 0) > + return result; > + > /* > * Verify we have a legal set of flags > * This leaves us room for future extensions.
