4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>

commit 23d6aef74da86a33fa6bb75f79565e0a16ee97c2 upstream.

`resource' can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential
exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

  kernel/sys.c:1474 __do_compat_sys_old_getrlimit() warn: potential spectre 
issue 'get_current()->signal->rlim' (local cap)
  kernel/sys.c:1455 __do_sys_old_getrlimit() warn: potential spectre issue 
'get_current()->signal->rlim' (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing *resource* before using it to index
current->signal->rlim

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to
kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Cc: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

---
 kernel/sys.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@
 #include <linux/uidgid.h>
 #include <linux/cred.h>
 
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+
 #include <linux/kmsg_dump.h>
 /* Move somewhere else to avoid recompiling? */
 #include <generated/utsrelease.h>
@@ -1311,6 +1313,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned
        if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
                return -EINVAL;
 
+       resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS);
        task_lock(current->group_leader);
        x = current->signal->rlim[resource];
        task_unlock(current->group_leader);


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