On Thu, May 31, 2018 at 05:35:15PM -0400, Steven Rostedt wrote:
> On Mon, 28 May 2018 11:46:42 +1000
> "Tobin C. Harding" <m...@tobin.cc> wrote:
>
> > Currently printing [hashed] pointers requires enough entropy to be
> > available. Early in the boot sequence this may not be the case
> > resulting in a dummy string '(____ptrval____)' being printed. This
> > makes debugging the early boot sequence difficult. We can relax the
> > requirement to use cryptographically secure hashing during debugging.
> > This enables debugging while keeping development/production kernel
> > behaviour the same.
> >
> > If new command line option debug_boot_weak_hash is enabled use
> > cryptographically insecure hashing and hash pointer value immediately.
> >
>
> I was able to play with this. It did start showing real pointers after
> the early parameters are parsed. Hopefully we don't need anything
> before that. But that is still much earlier than what we had before.
Cool, thanks for testing.
> > Cc: Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-ma...@linutronix.de>
> > Cc: Steven Rostedt <rost...@goodmis.org>
> > Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdun...@infradead.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <m...@tobin.cc>
> > ---
> > Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 +++++++++
> > lib/vsprintf.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
> > 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > index f2040d46f095..8a86d895343e 100644
> > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > @@ -753,6 +753,15 @@
> >
> > debug [KNL] Enable kernel debugging (events log level).
> >
> > + debug_boot_weak_hash
> > + [KNL] Enable printing pointers early in the boot
> > + sequence. If enabled, we use a weak hash instead of
> > + siphash to hash pointers. Use this option if you need
> > + to see pointer values during early boot (i.e you are
> > + seeing instances of '(___ptrval___)').
> > + Cryptographically insecure, please do not use on
> > + production kernels.
> > +
> > debug_locks_verbose=
> > [KNL] verbose self-tests
> > Format=<0|1>
> > diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
> > index 1545a8aa26a9..369623205e2c 100644
> > --- a/lib/vsprintf.c
> > +++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
> > @@ -1670,6 +1670,20 @@ char *pointer_string(char *buf, char *end, const
> > void *ptr,
> > }
> >
> > static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(not_filled_random_ptr_key);
> > +
> > +/* Make pointers available for printing early in the boot sequence. */
> > +static int debug_boot_weak_hash __ro_after_init;
> > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(debug_boot_weak_hash);
> > +
> > +static int __init debug_boot_weak_hash_enable(char *str)
> > +{
> > + debug_boot_weak_hash = 1;
> > + pr_info("debug_boot_weak_hash enabled\n");
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +early_param("debug_boot_weak_hash", debug_boot_weak_hash_enable);
> > +
> > +static bool have_filled_random_ptr_key __read_mostly;
> > static siphash_key_t ptr_key __read_mostly;
> >
> > static void enable_ptr_key_workfn(struct work_struct *work)
> > @@ -1721,6 +1735,12 @@ static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, void
> > *ptr, struct printf_spec spec)
> > unsigned long hashval;
> > const int default_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr);
> >
> > + /* When debugging early boot use non-cryptographically secure hash */
> > + if (unlikely(debug_boot_weak_hash)) {
>
> Perhaps we should make the debug_boot_weak_hash into a static key too.
> That way, it's constant jump instead of a compare.
Happy to do it but isn't that a bit of an over optimization, is printing
ever that performance critical?
Of course, if on second thoughts you still think it's worth doing I'll
code it up.
thanks,
Tobin.
