From: Jiri Kosina <jkos...@suse.cz>
If spectrev2 mitigation has been enabled, we're filling RSB on context
switch in order to protect from various classess of spectrev2 attacks.
If this mitigation is enabled, say so in sysfs for spectrev2.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkos...@suse.cz>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 53eb14a65610..fe32103fcdc7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -874,10 +874,11 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct
device_attribute *attr
return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer
sanitization\n");
case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2:
- ret = sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s\n",
spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
+ ret = sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" :
"",
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ",
IBRS_FW" : "",
(x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP) ? ",
STIBP" : "",
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB
filling" : "",
spectre_v2_module_string());
return ret;
--
2.12.3
--
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs
