This patch aims to make it harder to perform cache timing attacks on data
left behind by system calls. If we have an error returned from a syscall,
flush the L1 cache.

It's important to note that this patch is not addressing any specific
exploit, nor is it intended to be a complete defense against anything.
It is intended to be a low cost way of eliminating some of side effects
of a failed system call.

A performance test using sysbench on one hyperthread and a script which
attempts to repeatedly access files it does not have permission to access
on the other hyperthread found no significant performance impact.

Suggested-by: Alan Cox <a...@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kristen Carlson Accardi <kris...@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig        |  9 +++++++++
 arch/x86/entry/common.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 1a0be022f91d..bde978eb3b4e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -445,6 +445,15 @@ config RETPOLINE
          code are eliminated. Since this includes the syscall entry path,
          it is not entirely pointless.
 
+config SYSCALL_FLUSH
+       bool "Clear L1 Cache on syscall errors"
+       default n
+       help
+         Selecting 'y' allows the L1 cache to be cleared upon return of
+         an error code from a syscall if the CPU supports "flush_l1d".
+         This may reduce the likelyhood of speculative execution style
+         attacks on syscalls.
+
 config INTEL_RDT
        bool "Intel Resource Director Technology support"
        default n
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/common.c b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
index 3b2490b81918..26de8ea71293 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
@@ -268,6 +268,20 @@ __visible inline void syscall_return_slowpath(struct 
pt_regs *regs)
        prepare_exit_to_usermode(regs);
 }
 
+__visible inline void l1_cache_flush(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+       if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SYSCALL_FLUSH) &&
+           static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D)) {
+               if (regs->ax == 0 || regs->ax == -EAGAIN ||
+                   regs->ax == -EEXIST || regs->ax == -ENOENT ||
+                   regs->ax == -EXDEV || regs->ax == -ETIMEDOUT ||
+                   regs->ax == -ENOTCONN || regs->ax == -EINPROGRESS)
+                       return;
+
+               wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD, L1D_FLUSH);
+       }
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 __visible void do_syscall_64(unsigned long nr, struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
@@ -290,6 +304,8 @@ __visible void do_syscall_64(unsigned long nr, struct 
pt_regs *regs)
                regs->ax = sys_call_table[nr](regs);
        }
 
+       l1_cache_flush(regs);
+
        syscall_return_slowpath(regs);
 }
 #endif
@@ -338,6 +354,8 @@ static __always_inline void do_syscall_32_irqs_on(struct 
pt_regs *regs)
 #endif /* CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION */
        }
 
+       l1_cache_flush(regs);
+
        syscall_return_slowpath(regs);
 }
 
-- 
2.14.4

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