On Fri, Oct 12, 2018 at 7:29 AM, Theodore Y. Ts'o <[email protected]> wrote: > On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 03:54:21PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: >> Right now rand_initialize() is run as an early_initcall(), but it only >> depends on timekeeping_init() (for mixing ktime_get_real() into the >> pools). However, the call to boot_init_stack_canary() for stack canary >> initialization runs earlier, which triggers a warning at boot: >> >> random: get_random_bytes called from start_kernel+0x357/0x548 with >> crng_init=0 >> >> Instead, this moves rand_initialize() to after timekeeping_init(), and moves >> canary initialization here as well. >> >> Note that this warning may still remain for machines that do not have >> UEFI RNG support (which initializes the RNG pools durting setup_arch()), >> or for x86 machines without RDRAND (or booting without "random.trust=on" >> or CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU=y). >> >> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]> > > This seems reasonable to me. Were you hoping to get this in for -rc8? > It looks sane, and I don't see any _obvious_ unintended consequences > of such a change, but it's rather late in the development cycle, and > it isn't regression fix.
Yeah, for sure. I didn't mean this for 4.19. I assumed -next, and likely further changes based on discussion, etc etc. -Kees -- Kees Cook Pixel Security
