On Tue, 2018-10-16 at 16:32 +0200, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote: > hdr.cmd can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to > a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. > > This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: > > drivers/infiniband/core/ucm.c:1127 ib_ucm_write() warn: potential > spectre issue 'ucm_cmd_table' [r] (local cap) > > Fix this by sanitizing hdr.cmd before using it to index > ucm_cmd_table. > > Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is > to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be > completed with a dependent load/store [1]. > > [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 > > Cc: sta...@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gust...@embeddedor.com>
Thanks, applied to for-rc.
--
Doug Ledford <dledf...@redhat.com>
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