> -----Original Message-----
> From: Tim Chen [mailto:[email protected]]
> Sent: Tuesday, October 30, 2018 11:49 AM
> To: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>; Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
> Cc: Tim Chen <[email protected]>; Tom Lendacky
> <[email protected]>; Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>; Peter
> Zijlstra <[email protected]>; Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>;
> Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>; David Woodhouse
> <[email protected]>; Andi Kleen <[email protected]>; Hansen, Dave
> <[email protected]>; Schaufler, Casey <[email protected]>;
> Mallick, Asit K <[email protected]>; Arjan van de Ven
> <[email protected]>; Jon Masters <[email protected]>; Waiman Long
> <[email protected]>; [email protected]; [email protected]
> Subject: [Patch v4 16/18] x86/speculation: Enable STIBP to protect security
> sensitive tasks
> 
> Enable STIBP defense on high security tasks.
> 
> For normal tasks, STIBP is unused so they are not impacted by overhead
> from STIBP in lite protection mode.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <[email protected]>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 33 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> index 54f4675..b402b96 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> @@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
>  #include <linux/module.h>
>  #include <linux/nospec.h>
>  #include <linux/prctl.h>
> +#include <linux/sched/coredump.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
> 
>  #include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
>  #include <asm/cmdline.h>
> @@ -770,6 +772,37 @@ static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task,
> unsigned long ctrl)
>       return 0;
>  }
> 
> +static void set_task_stibp(struct task_struct *tsk, bool stibp_on)
> +{
> +     bool update = false;
> +
> +     if (!static_branch_unlikely(&spectre_v2_app_lite))
> +             return;
> +
> +     if (stibp_on)
> +             update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_STIBP);
> +     else
> +             update = test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_STIBP);
> +
> +     if (!update)
> +             return;
> +
> +     if (tsk == current)
> +             speculation_ctrl_update_current();
> +}
> +
> +void arch_set_security(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int value)

In this context "security" isn't descriptive. arch_set_stibp_defenses()
would be better.

Since "value" should only ever have one of two values, and those
map directly to "true" or "false" this should be a bool, making the
code trivial:

void arch_set_stibp_defenses(struct task_struct *task, bool stibp)
{
        set_task_stibp(task, stibp);
}

Or perhaps arch_set_security() should go away, and the calling
code would call set_task_stibp() directly. Unless there is some compelling
reason for the abstractions.

> +{
> +     if (value > SECURITY_HIGH)
> +             return;
> +
> +     /* Update STIBP defenses */
> +     if (value == SECURITY_HIGH)
> +             set_task_stibp(tsk, true);
> +     else
> +             set_task_stibp(tsk, false);
> +}
> +
>  int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which,
>                            unsigned long ctrl)
>  {
> --
> 2.9.4

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