4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------ From: Thomas Gleixner [email protected] commit 46f7ecb1e7359f183f5bbd1e08b90e10e52164f9 upstream The IBPB control code in x86 removed the usage. Remove the functionality which was introduced for this. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> Cc: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]> Cc: David Woodhouse <[email protected]> Cc: Tim Chen <[email protected]> Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Cc: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]> Cc: Asit Mallick <[email protected]> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <[email protected]> Cc: Jon Masters <[email protected]> Cc: Waiman Long <[email protected]> Cc: Greg KH <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Stewart <[email protected]> Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> --- include/linux/ptrace.h | 17 ----------------- kernel/ptrace.c | 10 ---------- 2 files changed, 27 deletions(-) --- a/include/linux/ptrace.h +++ b/include/linux/ptrace.h @@ -64,15 +64,12 @@ extern void exit_ptrace(struct task_stru #define PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT 0x04 #define PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS 0x08 #define PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS 0x10 -#define PTRACE_MODE_SCHED 0x20 -#define PTRACE_MODE_IBPB 0x40 /* shorthands for READ/ATTACH and FSCREDS/REALCREDS combinations */ #define PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS) #define PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS) #define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS) #define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH | PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS) -#define PTRACE_MODE_SPEC_IBPB (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS | PTRACE_MODE_IBPB) /** * ptrace_may_access - check whether the caller is permitted to access @@ -90,20 +87,6 @@ extern void exit_ptrace(struct task_stru */ extern bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode); -/** - * ptrace_may_access - check whether the caller is permitted to access - * a target task. - * @task: target task - * @mode: selects type of access and caller credentials - * - * Returns true on success, false on denial. - * - * Similar to ptrace_may_access(). Only to be called from context switch - * code. Does not call into audit and the regular LSM hooks due to locking - * constraints. - */ -extern bool ptrace_may_access_sched(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode); - static inline int ptrace_reparented(struct task_struct *child) { return !same_thread_group(child->real_parent, child->parent); --- a/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -261,9 +261,6 @@ static int ptrace_check_attach(struct ta static int ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode) { - if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_SCHED) - return false; - if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) return has_ns_capability_noaudit(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE); else @@ -331,16 +328,9 @@ ok: !ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode))) return -EPERM; - if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_SCHED) - return 0; return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode); } -bool ptrace_may_access_sched(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode) -{ - return __ptrace_may_access(task, mode | PTRACE_MODE_SCHED); -} - bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode) { int err;
