4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ilya Dryomov <idryo...@gmail.com>
commit 130f52f2b203aa0aec179341916ffb2e905f3afd upstream.
Avoid scribbling over memory if the received reply/challenge is larger
than the buffer supplied with the authorizer.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryo...@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <s...@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchi...@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gre...@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/ceph/messenger.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
--- a/net/ceph/messenger.c
+++ b/net/ceph/messenger.c
@@ -1738,6 +1738,13 @@ static int read_partial_connect(struct c
if (con->auth) {
size = le32_to_cpu(con->in_reply.authorizer_len);
+ if (size > con->auth->authorizer_reply_buf_len) {
+ pr_err("authorizer reply too big: %d > %zu\n", size,
+ con->auth->authorizer_reply_buf_len);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
end += size;
ret = read_partial(con, end, size,
con->auth->authorizer_reply_buf);
