From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <[email protected]> Date: Mon, 10 Dec 2018 12:41:24 -0600
> vr.vifi is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to > a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. > > This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: > > net/ipv4/ipmr.c:1616 ipmr_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue > 'mrt->vif_table' [r] (local cap) > net/ipv4/ipmr.c:1690 ipmr_compat_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue > 'mrt->vif_table' [r] (local cap) > > Fix this by sanitizing vr.vifi before using it to index mrt->vif_table' > > Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is > to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be > completed with a dependent load/store [1]. > > [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 > > Cc: [email protected] > Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]> Applied and queued up for -stable. Please do not CC: stable for networking bug fixes, thank you.
