I still claim that (0xfffffffffffff000, 4096) is not a valid C "pointer
to an object" according to the C standard - please see my reply below.
And I thought ASLR was introduced to improve security and not to create
new security problems - someone from the ASLR team has to comment on this.
Cheers,
Markus
On 2018-12-12 06:21, Yueyi Li wrote:
> Hi Markus,
>
> OK, thanks. I`ll change it in v3.
>
> Thanks,
> Yueyi
>
> On 2018/12/6 23:03, Markus F.X.J. Oberhumer wrote:
>> Hi Yueyi,
>>
>> yes, my LZO patch works for all cases.
>>
>> The reason behind the issue in the first place is that if KASLR
>> includes the very last page 0xfffffffffffff000 then we do not have a
>> valid C "pointer to an object" anymore because of address wraparound.
>>
>> Unrelated to my patch I'd argue that KASLR should *NOT* include the
>> very last page - indeed that might cause similar wraparound problems
>> in lots of code.
>>
>> Eg, look at this simple clear_memory() implementation:
>>
>> void clear_memory(char *p, size_t len) {
>> char *end = p + len;
>> while (p < end)
>> *p++= 0;
>> }
>>
>> Valid code like this will fail horribly when (p, len) is the very
>> last virtual page (because end will be the NULL pointer in this case).
>>
>> Cheers,
>> Markus
>>
>>
>>
>> On 2018-12-05 04:07, Yueyi Li wrote:
>>> Hi Markus,
>>>
>>> Thanks for your review.
>>>
>>> On 2018/12/4 18:20, Markus F.X.J. Oberhumer wrote:
>>>> Hi,
>>>>
>>>> I don't think that address space wraparound is legal in C, but I
>>>> understand that we are in kernel land and if you really want to
>>>> compress the last virtual page 0xfffffffffffff000 the following
>>>> small patch should fix that dubious case.
>>> I guess the VA 0xfffffffffffff000 is available because KASLR be
>>> enabled. For this case we can see:
>>>
>>> crash> kmem 0xfffffffffffff000
>>> PAGE PHYSICAL MAPPING INDEX CNT FLAGS
>>> ffffffbfffffffc0 1fffff000 ffffffff1655ecb9 7181fd5 2
>>> 8000000000064209 locked,uptodate,owner_priv_1,writeback,reclaim,swapbacked
>>>
>>>> This also avoids slowing down the the hot path of the compression
>>>> core function.
>>>>
>>>> Cheers,
>>>> Markus
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress.c b/lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress.c
>>>> index 236eb21167b5..959dec45f6fe 100644
>>>> --- a/lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress.c
>>>> +++ b/lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress.c
>>>> @@ -224,8 +224,8 @@ int lzo1x_1_compress(const unsigned char *in, size_t
>>>> in_len,
>>>>
>>>> while (l > 20) {
>>>> size_t ll = l <= (M4_MAX_OFFSET + 1) ? l :
>>>> (M4_MAX_OFFSET + 1);
>>>> - uintptr_t ll_end = (uintptr_t) ip + ll;
>>>> - if ((ll_end + ((t + ll) >> 5)) <= ll_end)
>>>> + // check for address space wraparound
>>>> + if (((uintptr_t) ip + ll + ((t + ll) >> 5)) <= (uintptr_t)
>>>> ip)
>>>> break;
>>>> BUILD_BUG_ON(D_SIZE * sizeof(lzo_dict_t) >
>>>> LZO1X_1_MEM_COMPRESS);
>>>> memset(wrkmem, 0, D_SIZE * sizeof(lzo_dict_t));
>>> I parsed panic ramdump and loaded CPU register values, can see:
>>>
>>> -000|lzo1x_1_do_compress(
>>> | in = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFF000,
>>> | ?,
>>> | out = 0xFFFFFFFF2E2EE000,
>>> | out_len = 0xFFFFFF801CAA3510,
>>> | ?,
>>> | wrkmem = 0xFFFFFFFF4EBC0000)
>>> | dict = 0xFFFFFFFF4EBC0000
>>> | op = 0x1
>>> | ip = 0x9
>>> | ii = 0x9
>>> | in_end = 0x0
>>> | ip_end = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEC
>>> | m_len = 0
>>> | m_off = 1922
>>> -001|lzo1x_1_compress(
>>> | in = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFF000,
>>> | in_len = 0,
>>> | out = 0xFFFFFFFF2E2EE000,
>>> | out_len = 0x00000001616FB7D0,
>>> | wrkmem = 0xFFFFFFFF4EBC0000)
>>> | ip = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFF000
>>> | op = 0xFFFFFFFF2E2EE000
>>> | l = 4096
>>> | t = 0
>>> | ll = 4096
>>>
>>> ll = l = in_len = 4096 in lzo1x_1_compress, so your patch is working
>>> for this panic case, but, I`m
>>> not sure, is it possible that in = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFF000 and in_len < 4096?
>>>
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>> Yueyi
>>>
>
>
--
Markus Oberhumer, <[email protected]>, http://www.oberhumer.com/
