"uattr->size" is copied in from user space and checked. However, it is
copied in again after the security check. A malicious user may race to
change it. The fix checks if uattr->size is ever changed after the
check.

Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <[email protected]>
---
 kernel/sched/core.c | 18 ++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
index 6fedf3a98581..0a55bdce9a42 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -4447,7 +4447,7 @@ do_sched_setscheduler(pid_t pid, int policy, struct 
sched_param __user *param)
  */
 static int sched_copy_attr(struct sched_attr __user *uattr, struct sched_attr 
*attr)
 {
-       u32 size;
+       u32 size, size_cp;
        int ret;
 
        if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, uattr, SCHED_ATTR_SIZE_VER0))
@@ -4460,15 +4460,17 @@ static int sched_copy_attr(struct sched_attr __user 
*uattr, struct sched_attr *a
        if (ret)
                return ret;
 
+       size_cp = size;
+
        /* Bail out on silly large: */
        if (size > PAGE_SIZE)
                goto err_size;
 
        /* ABI compatibility quirk: */
        if (!size)
-               size = SCHED_ATTR_SIZE_VER0;
+               size_cp = SCHED_ATTR_SIZE_VER0;
 
-       if (size < SCHED_ATTR_SIZE_VER0)
+       else if (size < SCHED_ATTR_SIZE_VER0)
                goto err_size;
 
        /*
@@ -4483,7 +4485,7 @@ static int sched_copy_attr(struct sched_attr __user 
*uattr, struct sched_attr *a
                unsigned char val;
 
                addr = (void __user *)uattr + sizeof(*attr);
-               end  = (void __user *)uattr + size;
+               end  = (void __user *)uattr + size_cp;
 
                for (; addr < end; addr++) {
                        ret = get_user(val, addr);
@@ -4492,13 +4494,17 @@ static int sched_copy_attr(struct sched_attr __user 
*uattr, struct sched_attr *a
                        if (val)
                                goto err_size;
                }
-               size = sizeof(*attr);
+               size_cp = sizeof(*attr);
        }
 
-       ret = copy_from_user(attr, uattr, size);
+       ret = copy_from_user(attr, uattr, size_cp);
        if (ret)
                return -EFAULT;
 
+       /* Sanity check if size was changed in user space */
+       if (attr->size != size)
+               return -EINVAL;
+
        /*
         * XXX: Do we want to be lenient like existing syscalls; or do we want
         * to be strict and return an error on out-of-bounds values?
-- 
2.17.2 (Apple Git-113)

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