On Sun, Jul 29, 2007 at 06:40:43PM +0800, Eugene Teo wrote: > Neil Horman wrote: > > Ok, here we go > > > > As promised, I'm reposting the core_pattern enhancements I've done over the > > past > > few days. These three patches replace and conintue the work contained in > > the > > following patches, and can replace them: > > update-coredump-path-in-kernel-to-not-check-coredump-rlim-if-core_pattern-is-a-pipe.patch > > allow-individual-core-dump-methods-to-be-unlimited-when-sending-to-a-pipe.patch > > allow-individual-core-dump-methods-to-be-unlimited-when-sending-to-a-pipe-fix.patch > > allow-individual-core-dump-methods-to-be-unlimited-when-sending-to-a-pipe-fix-2.patch > > allow-individual-core-dump-methods-to-be-unlimited-when-sending-to-a-pipe-fix-2-fix.patch > > allow-individual-core-dump-methods-to-be-unlimited-when-sending-to-a-pipe-sparc64-fix.patch > > allow-individual-core-dump-methods-to-be-unlimited-when-sending-to-a-pipe-fix-2-sparc64-fix.patch > [...] > > You may want to improve your patches with style-related changes, including > removing trailing spaces, using tabs instead of spaces, and defining pointers > like char *ptr instead of char * ptr. > I assume this is just a general comment, since as far as I can see, I've followed those guidelines.
> Also, it is probably good to think how we can "drop privileges" while piping > the core dump output to an external program. A malicious user can potentially > use it as a possible backdoor since anything that is executed by "|program" > will > be executed with root privileges. > It was my understanding that apport already did this. Thanks and Regards Neil > Eugene -- /*************************************************** *Neil Horman *Software Engineer *Red Hat, Inc. [EMAIL PROTECTED] *gpg keyid: 1024D / 0x92A74FA1 *http://pgp.mit.edu ***************************************************/ - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
