Hi, > Jeremy Linton <[email protected]> hat am 15. Januar 2019 um 22:21 > geschrieben: > > > Hi, > > On 01/15/2019 01:50 PM, Stefan Wahren wrote: > > Hi Jeremy, > > > >> Jeremy Linton <[email protected]> hat am 10. Januar 2019 um 00:55 > >> geschrieben: > >> > >> > >> Arm64 machines should be displaying a human readable > >> vulnerability status to speculative execution attacks in > >> /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities > >> > >> This series enables that behavior by providing the expected > >> functions. Those functions expose the cpu errata and feature > >> states, as well as whether firmware is responding appropriately > >> to display the overall machine status. This means that in a > >> heterogeneous machine we will only claim the machine is mitigated > >> or safe if we are confident all booted cores are safe or > >> mitigated. > >> > > > > i applied this v3 series and Marc's v2 series. > > > > Now i'm getting the following on a Raspberry Pi 3 B+ : > > > > meltdown:Not affected > > spec_store_bypass:Not affected > > spectre_v1:Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization > > > > So the entries l1tf and spectre_v2 disappeared. > > Yes, the l1tf entry should be gone. > > I believe there is a problem with the "1/2 advertise.." patch in that > the 'arm64_requested_vuln_attrs |=' line needs to be hoisted to the top > of check_branch_predictor() and the '__spectrev2_safe = false' line > needs to be hoisted 6 lines immediately above "/* Fallback to firmware > detection*/"
a snippet or a new version would be nice > > That should re-enable the spectre_v2 entry.
