On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 04:49:09PM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> When crypto agility support will be added to the TPM driver, users of the
> driver have to retrieve the allocated banks from chip->allocated_banks and
> use this information to prepare the array of tpm_digest structures to be
> passed to tpm_pcr_extend().
> 
> This patch retrieves a tpm_chip pointer from tpm_default_chip() so that the
> pointer can be used to prepare the array of tpm_digest structures.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>
> ---
>  security/keys/trusted.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
>  1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
> index 4d98f4f87236..1a20a9692fef 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
> @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
>  
>  static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha1)";
>  static const char hash_alg[] = "sha1";
> +static struct tpm_chip *chip;
>  
>  struct sdesc {
>       struct shash_desc shash;
> @@ -362,7 +363,7 @@ int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen)
>       int rc;
>  
>       dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
> -     rc = tpm_send(NULL, cmd, buflen);
> +     rc = tpm_send(chip, cmd, buflen);
>       dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
>       if (rc > 0)
>               /* Can't return positive return codes values to keyctl */
> @@ -384,10 +385,10 @@ static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum)
>  
>       if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
>               return -EPERM;
> -     ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
> +     ret = tpm_get_random(chip, hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
>       if (ret != SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
>               return ret;
> -     return tpm_pcr_extend(NULL, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0;
> +     return tpm_pcr_extend(chip, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0;
>  }
>  
>  /*
> @@ -400,7 +401,7 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s,
>       unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
>       int ret;
>  
> -     ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
> +     ret = tpm_get_random(chip, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
>       if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
>               return ret;
>  
> @@ -496,7 +497,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
>       if (ret < 0)
>               goto out;
>  
> -     ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
> +     ret = tpm_get_random(chip, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
>       if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
>               goto out;
>       ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL);
> @@ -606,7 +607,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
>  
>       ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL);
>       keyhndl = htonl(SRKHANDLE);
> -     ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
> +     ret = tpm_get_random(chip, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
>       if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) {
>               pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret);
>               return ret;
> @@ -751,7 +752,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload 
> *pay,
>       int i;
>       int tpm2;
>  
> -     tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(NULL);
> +     tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip);
>       if (tpm2 < 0)
>               return tpm2;
>  
> @@ -920,7 +921,7 @@ static struct trusted_key_options 
> *trusted_options_alloc(void)
>       struct trusted_key_options *options;
>       int tpm2;
>  
> -     tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(NULL);
> +     tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip);
>       if (tpm2 < 0)
>               return NULL;
>  
> @@ -970,7 +971,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
>       size_t key_len;
>       int tpm2;
>  
> -     tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(NULL);
> +     tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip);
>       if (tpm2 < 0)
>               return tpm2;
>  
> @@ -1011,7 +1012,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
>       switch (key_cmd) {
>       case Opt_load:
>               if (tpm2)
> -                     ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(NULL, payload, options);
> +                     ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(chip, payload, options);
>               else
>                       ret = key_unseal(payload, options);
>               dump_payload(payload);
> @@ -1021,13 +1022,13 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
>               break;
>       case Opt_new:
>               key_len = payload->key_len;
> -             ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, payload->key, key_len);
> +             ret = tpm_get_random(chip, payload->key, key_len);
>               if (ret != key_len) {
>                       pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret);
>                       goto out;
>               }
>               if (tpm2)
> -                     ret = tpm_seal_trusted(NULL, payload, options);
> +                     ret = tpm_seal_trusted(chip, payload, options);
>               else
>                       ret = key_seal(payload, options);
>               if (ret < 0)
> @@ -1225,17 +1226,26 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void)
>  {
>       int ret;
>  
> +     chip = tpm_default_chip();
> +     if (!chip)
> +             return -ENOENT;
>       ret = trusted_shash_alloc();
>       if (ret < 0)
> -             return ret;
> +             goto out_put;
>       ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
>       if (ret < 0)
> -             trusted_shash_release();
> +             goto out_release;
> +     return 0;
> +out_release:
> +     trusted_shash_release();
> +out_put:
> +     put_device(&chip->dev);
>       return ret;
>  }

Since the labels are *only* used for exception fallbacks, I'd prefer
err_release and err_put.

Other than that, LGTM.

Unrelated side-note: I think the TPM subsystem starts to be soon in a
shape that TPM 2.0 trusted keys code could be eventually moved to
security/keys/trusted2.c, and TPM 1.2 trusted keys code could start to
use tpm_buf to build its commands.

/Jarkko

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