Please consider this patch as Ack-by: Suganath Prabu S
<suganath-prabu.subram...@broadcom.com>
Thanks,
Suganath.
On Mon, May 27, 2019 at 6:27 AM Gen Zhang <blackgod016...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> In _ctl_ioctl_main(), 'ioctl_header' is fetched the first time from
> userspace. 'ioctl_header.ioc_number' is then checked. The legal result
> is saved to 'ioc'. Then, in condition MPT3COMMAND, the whole struct is
> fetched again from the userspace. Then _ctl_do_mpt_command() is called,
> 'ioc' and 'karg' as inputs.
>
> However, a malicious user can change the 'ioc_number' between the two
> fetches, which will cause a potential security issues. Moreover, a
> malicious user can provide a valid 'ioc_number' to pass the check in
> first fetch, and then modify it in the second fetch.
>
> To fix this, we need to recheck the 'ioc_number' in the second fetch.
>
> Signed-off-by: Gen Zhang <blackgod016...@gmail.com>
> ---
> diff --git a/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_ctl.c
> b/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_ctl.c
> index b2bb47c..5181c03 100644
> --- a/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_ctl.c
> +++ b/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_ctl.c
> @@ -2319,6 +2319,10 @@ _ctl_ioctl_main(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
> void __user *arg,
> break;
> }
>
> + if (karg.hdr.ioc_number != ioctl_header.ioc_number) {
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + break;
> + }
> if (_IOC_SIZE(cmd) == sizeof(struct mpt3_ioctl_command)) {
> uarg = arg;
> ret = _ctl_do_mpt_command(ioc, karg, &uarg->mf);
