It seems that since it was added in kernel 2.2.0 (sic) securebits
was never used.
This patch therefore removes it.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
include/linux/sched.h | 1 -
include/linux/securebits.h | 30 ------------------------------
kernel/capability.c | 1 -
security/commoncap.c | 34 ++++++++++++++--------------------
security/dummy.c | 16 +++++++---------
5 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)
30c1d49582d183ea4a7ee0ffd886dcd9e2344115
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 2b3c936..be2e9c4 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -67,7 +67,6 @@ struct sched_param {
#include <linux/smp.h>
#include <linux/sem.h>
#include <linux/signal.h>
-#include <linux/securebits.h>
#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <linux/completion.h>
diff --git a/include/linux/securebits.h b/include/linux/securebits.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 5b06178..0000000
--- a/include/linux/securebits.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-#ifndef _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H
-#define _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H 1
-
-#define SECUREBITS_DEFAULT 0x00000000
-
-extern unsigned securebits;
-
-/* When set UID 0 has no special privileges. When unset, we support
- inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root executable under
- compatibility mode. We raise the effective and inheritable bitmasks
- *of the executable file* if the effective uid of the new process is
- 0. If the real uid is 0, we raise the inheritable bitmask of the
- executable file. */
-#define SECURE_NOROOT 0
-
-/* When set, setuid to/from uid 0 does not trigger capability-"fixes"
- to be compatible with old programs relying on set*uid to loose
- privileges. When unset, setuid doesn't change privileges. */
-#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP 2
-
-/* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specify
- whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the
- setting is fixed or not. A setting which is fixed cannot be changed
- from user-level. */
-
-#define issecure(X) ( (1 << (X+1)) & SECUREBITS_DEFAULT ? \
- (1 << (X)) & SECUREBITS_DEFAULT : \
- (1 << (X)) & securebits )
-
-#endif /* !_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index 20914d8..d3696a9 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@
#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
-unsigned securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT; /* systemwide security settings */
kernel_cap_t cap_bset = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET;
/*
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index ff87b80..ce8f686 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -241,14 +241,12 @@ int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
* and permitted sets of the executable file.
*/
- if (!issecure (SECURE_NOROOT)) {
- if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current->uid == 0) {
- cap_set_full (bprm->cap_inheritable);
- cap_set_full (bprm->cap_permitted);
- }
- if (bprm->e_uid == 0)
- bprm->cap_effective = true;
+ if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current->uid == 0) {
+ cap_set_full (bprm->cap_inheritable);
+ cap_set_full (bprm->cap_permitted);
}
+ if (bprm->e_uid == 0)
+ bprm->cap_effective = true;
return ret;
}
@@ -393,9 +391,7 @@ int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid,
uid_t old_suid,
case LSM_SETID_ID:
case LSM_SETID_RES:
/* Copied from kernel/sys.c:setreuid/setuid/setresuid. */
- if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
- cap_emulate_setxuid (old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid);
- }
+ cap_emulate_setxuid (old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid);
break;
case LSM_SETID_FS:
{
@@ -408,16 +404,14 @@ int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid,
uid_t old_suid,
* if not, we might be a bit too harsh here.
*/
- if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
- if (old_fsuid == 0 && current->fsuid != 0) {
- cap_t (current->cap_effective) &=
- ~CAP_FS_MASK;
- }
- if (old_fsuid != 0 && current->fsuid == 0) {
- cap_t (current->cap_effective) |=
- (cap_t (current->cap_permitted) &
- CAP_FS_MASK);
- }
+ if (old_fsuid == 0 && current->fsuid != 0) {
+ cap_t (current->cap_effective) &=
+ ~CAP_FS_MASK;
+ }
+ if (old_fsuid != 0 && current->fsuid == 0) {
+ cap_t (current->cap_effective) |=
+ (cap_t (current->cap_permitted) &
+ CAP_FS_MASK);
}
break;
}
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index 6999456..88bb1bc 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -37,15 +37,13 @@ static int dummy_capget (struct task_struct *target,
kernel_cap_t * effective,
kernel_cap_t * inheritable, kernel_cap_t * permitted)
{
*effective = *inheritable = *permitted = 0;
- if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
- if (target->euid == 0) {
- *permitted |= (~0 & ~CAP_FS_MASK);
- *effective |= (~0 & ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP) &
~CAP_FS_MASK);
- }
- if (target->fsuid == 0) {
- *permitted |= CAP_FS_MASK;
- *effective |= CAP_FS_MASK;
- }
+ if (target->euid == 0) {
+ *permitted |= (~0 & ~CAP_FS_MASK);
+ *effective |= (~0 & ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP) & ~CAP_FS_MASK);
+ }
+ if (target->fsuid == 0) {
+ *permitted |= CAP_FS_MASK;
+ *effective |= CAP_FS_MASK;
}
return 0;
}
-
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