On Wed, Jul 10, 2019 at 12:59:18PM +0200, Miroslav Benes wrote: > The livepatch consistency model requires reliable stack tracing > architecture support in order to work properly. In order to achieve > this, two main issues have to be solved. First, reliable and consistent > call chain backtracing has to be ensured. Second, the unwinder needs to > be able to detect stack corruptions and return errors. > > The "zSeries ELF Application Binary Interface Supplement" says: > > "The stack pointer points to the first word of the lowest allocated > stack frame. If the "back chain" is implemented this word will point to > the previously allocated stack frame (towards higher addresses), except > for the first stack frame, which shall have a back chain of zero (NULL). > The stack shall grow downwards, in other words towards lower addresses." > > "back chain" is optional. GCC option -mbackchain enables it. Quoting > Martin Schwidefsky [1]: > > "The compiler is called with the -mbackchain option, all normal C > function will store the backchain in the function prologue. All > functions written in assembler code should do the same, if you find one > that does not we should fix that. The end result is that a task that > *voluntarily* called schedule() should have a proper backchain at all > times. > > Dependent on the use case this may or may not be enough. Asynchronous > interrupts may stop the CPU at the beginning of a function, if kernel > preemption is enabled we can end up with a broken backchain. The > production kernels for IBM Z are all compiled *without* kernel > preemption. So yes, we might get away without the objtool support. > > On a side-note, we do have a line item to implement the ORC unwinder for > the kernel, that includes the objtool support. Once we have that we can > drop the -mbackchain option for the kernel build. That gives us a nice > little performance benefit. I hope that the change from backchain to the > ORC unwinder will not be too hard to implement in the livepatch tools." > > Thus, the call chain backtracing should be currently ensured and objtool > should not be necessary for livepatch purposes.
Hi Miroslav, Should there be a CONFIG? dependency on -mbackchain and/or kernel preemption, or does the following ensure that we don't need a explicit build time checks? > Regarding the second issue, stack corruptions and non-reliable states > have to be recognized by the unwinder. Mainly it means to detect > preemption or page faults, the end of the task stack must be reached, > return addresses must be valid text addresses and hacks like function > graph tracing and kretprobes must be properly detected. > > Unwinding a running task's stack is not a problem, because there is a > livepatch requirement that every checked task is blocked, except for the > current task. Due to that, the implementation can be much simpler > compared to the existing non-reliable infrastructure. We can consider a > task's kernel/thread stack only and skip the other stacks. > > Idle tasks are a bit special. Their final back chains point to no_dat > stacks. See for reference CALL_ON_STACK() in smp_start_secondary() > callback used in __cpu_up(). The unwinding is stopped there and it is > not considered to be a stack corruption. > > Signed-off-by: Miroslav Benes <mbe...@suse.cz> > --- > - based on Linus' master > - passes livepatch kselftests > - passes tests from https://github.com/lpechacek/qa_test_klp, which > stress the consistency model and the unwinder a bit more > > arch/s390/Kconfig | 1 + > arch/s390/include/asm/stacktrace.h | 5 ++ > arch/s390/include/asm/unwind.h | 19 ++++++ > arch/s390/kernel/dumpstack.c | 28 +++++++++ > arch/s390/kernel/stacktrace.c | 78 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ > arch/s390/kernel/unwind_bc.c | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 6 files changed, 224 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig > index fdb4246265a5..ea73e555063d 100644 > --- a/arch/s390/Kconfig > +++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig > @@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ config S390 > select HAVE_PERF_EVENTS > select HAVE_RCU_TABLE_FREE > select HAVE_REGS_AND_STACK_ACCESS_API > + select HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE > select HAVE_RSEQ > select HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS > select HAVE_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING > diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/stacktrace.h > b/arch/s390/include/asm/stacktrace.h > index 0ae4bbf7779c..2b5c913c408f 100644 > --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/stacktrace.h > +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/stacktrace.h > @@ -23,6 +23,11 @@ const char *stack_type_name(enum stack_type type); > int get_stack_info(unsigned long sp, struct task_struct *task, > struct stack_info *info, unsigned long *visit_mask); > > +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE > +int get_stack_info_reliable(unsigned long sp, struct task_struct *task, > + struct stack_info *info); > +#endif > + > static inline bool on_stack(struct stack_info *info, > unsigned long addr, size_t len) > { > diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/unwind.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/unwind.h > index d827b5b9a32c..1cc96c54169c 100644 > --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/unwind.h > +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/unwind.h > @@ -45,6 +45,25 @@ void __unwind_start(struct unwind_state *state, struct > task_struct *task, > bool unwind_next_frame(struct unwind_state *state); > unsigned long unwind_get_return_address(struct unwind_state *state); > > +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE > +void __unwind_start_reliable(struct unwind_state *state, > + struct task_struct *task, unsigned long sp); > +bool unwind_next_frame_reliable(struct unwind_state *state); > + > +static inline void unwind_start_reliable(struct unwind_state *state, > + struct task_struct *task) > +{ > + unsigned long sp; > + > + if (task == current) > + sp = current_stack_pointer(); > + else > + sp = task->thread.ksp; > + > + __unwind_start_reliable(state, task, sp); > +} > +#endif > + > static inline bool unwind_done(struct unwind_state *state) > { > return state->stack_info.type == STACK_TYPE_UNKNOWN; > diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/dumpstack.c b/arch/s390/kernel/dumpstack.c > index ac06c3949ab3..b21ef2a766ff 100644 > --- a/arch/s390/kernel/dumpstack.c > +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/dumpstack.c > @@ -127,6 +127,34 @@ int get_stack_info(unsigned long sp, struct task_struct > *task, > return -EINVAL; > } > > +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE > +int get_stack_info_reliable(unsigned long sp, struct task_struct *task, > + struct stack_info *info) > +{ > + if (!sp) > + goto error; > + > + /* Sanity check: ABI requires SP to be aligned 8 bytes. */ > + if (sp & 0x7) > + goto error; > + Does SP alignment only need to be checked for the initial frame, or should it be verified everytime it's moved in unwind_next_frame_reliable()? > + if (!task) > + goto error; > + > + /* > + * The unwinding should not start on nodat_stack, async_stack or > + * restart_stack. The task is either current or must be inactive. > + */ > + if (!in_task_stack(sp, task, info)) > + goto error; > + > + return 0; > +error: > + info->type = STACK_TYPE_UNKNOWN; > + return -EINVAL; > +} > +#endif > + > void show_stack(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long *stack) > { > struct unwind_state state; > diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/stacktrace.c b/arch/s390/kernel/stacktrace.c > index f6a620f854e1..7d774a325163 100644 > --- a/arch/s390/kernel/stacktrace.c > +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/stacktrace.c > @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ > #include <linux/export.h> > #include <asm/stacktrace.h> > #include <asm/unwind.h> > +#include <asm/kprobes.h> > > void save_stack_trace(struct stack_trace *trace) > { > @@ -60,3 +61,80 @@ void save_stack_trace_regs(struct pt_regs *regs, struct > stack_trace *trace) > } > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(save_stack_trace_regs); > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE > +/* > + * This function returns an error if it detects any unreliable features of > the > + * stack. Otherwise it guarantees that the stack trace is reliable. > + * > + * If the task is not 'current', the caller *must* ensure the task is > inactive. > + */ > +static __always_inline int > +__save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable(struct task_struct *tsk, > + struct stack_trace *trace) > +{ > + struct unwind_state state; > + > + for (unwind_start_reliable(&state, tsk); > + !unwind_done(&state) && !unwind_error(&state); > + unwind_next_frame_reliable(&state)) { > + > + if (!__kernel_text_address(state.ip)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_KPROBES > + /* > + * Mark stacktraces with kretprobed functions on them > + * as unreliable. > + */ > + if (state.ip == (unsigned long)kretprobe_trampoline) > + return -EINVAL; > +#endif > + > + if (trace->nr_entries >= trace->max_entries) > + return -E2BIG; > + > + if (!trace->skip) > + trace->entries[trace->nr_entries++] = state.ip; > + else > + trace->skip--; > + } > + > + /* Check for stack corruption */ > + if (unwind_error(&state)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + /* Store kernel_thread_starter, null for swapper/0 */ > + if (tsk->flags & (PF_KTHREAD | PF_IDLE)) { > + if (trace->nr_entries >= trace->max_entries) > + return -E2BIG; > + > + if (!trace->skip) > + trace->entries[trace->nr_entries++] = > + state.regs->psw.addr; > + else > + trace->skip--; An idea for a follow up patch: stuff this into a function like int save_trace_entry(struct stack_trace *trace, unsigned long entry); which could one day make the trace->entries[] code generic across arches. > + } > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +int save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable(struct task_struct *tsk, > + struct stack_trace *trace) > +{ > + int ret; > + > + /* > + * If the task doesn't have a stack (e.g., a zombie), the stack is > + * "reliably" empty. > + */ > + if (!try_get_task_stack(tsk)) > + return 0; > + > + ret = __save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable(tsk, trace); > + > + put_task_stack(tsk); > + > + return ret; > +} > +#endif > diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/unwind_bc.c b/arch/s390/kernel/unwind_bc.c > index 3ce8a0808059..ada3a8538961 100644 > --- a/arch/s390/kernel/unwind_bc.c > +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/unwind_bc.c > @@ -153,3 +153,96 @@ void __unwind_start(struct unwind_state *state, struct > task_struct *task, > state->reliable = reliable; > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__unwind_start); > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE > +void __unwind_start_reliable(struct unwind_state *state, > + struct task_struct *task, unsigned long sp) > +{ > + struct stack_info *info = &state->stack_info; > + struct stack_frame *sf; > + unsigned long ip; > + > + memset(state, 0, sizeof(*state)); > + state->task = task; > + > + /* Get current stack pointer and initialize stack info */ > + if (get_stack_info_reliable(sp, task, info) || > + !on_stack(info, sp, sizeof(struct stack_frame))) { > + /* Something is wrong with the stack pointer */ > + info->type = STACK_TYPE_UNKNOWN; > + state->error = true; > + return; > + } > + > + /* Get the instruction pointer from the stack frame */ > + sf = (struct stack_frame *) sp; > + ip = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(sf->gprs[8]); > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER > + /* Decode any ftrace redirection */ > + if (ip == (unsigned long) return_to_handler) > + ip = ftrace_graph_ret_addr(state->task, &state->graph_idx, > + ip, NULL); ^^^^ double checking: we ignore the retp here and not in the next-frame case? > +#endif > + > + /* Update unwind state */ > + state->sp = sp; > + state->ip = ip; > +} > + > +bool unwind_next_frame_reliable(struct unwind_state *state) > +{ > + struct stack_info *info = &state->stack_info; > + struct stack_frame *sf; > + struct pt_regs *regs; > + unsigned long sp, ip; > + > + sf = (struct stack_frame *) state->sp; > + sp = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(sf->back_chain); > + /* > + * Idle tasks are special. The final back-chain points to nodat_stack. > + * See CALL_ON_STACK() in smp_start_secondary() callback used in > + * __cpu_up(). We just accept it, go to else branch and look for > + * pt_regs. > + */ > + if (likely(sp && !(is_idle_task(state->task) && > + outside_of_stack(state, sp)))) { > + /* Non-zero back-chain points to the previous frame */ > + if (unlikely(outside_of_stack(state, sp))) > + goto out_err; > + > + sf = (struct stack_frame *) sp; > + ip = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(sf->gprs[8]); > + } else { > + /* No back-chain, look for a pt_regs structure */ > + sp = state->sp + STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD; > + regs = (struct pt_regs *) sp; > + if ((unsigned long)regs != info->end - sizeof(struct pt_regs)) > + goto out_err; > + if (!(state->task->flags & (PF_KTHREAD | PF_IDLE)) && > + !user_mode(regs)) > + goto out_err; > + > + state->regs = regs; > + goto out_stop; > + } > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER > + /* Decode any ftrace redirection */ > + if (ip == (unsigned long) return_to_handler) > + ip = ftrace_graph_ret_addr(state->task, &state->graph_idx, > + ip, (void *) sp); > +#endif > + > + /* Update unwind state */ > + state->sp = sp; > + state->ip = ip; minor nit: maybe the CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER and "Update unwind state" logic could be combined into a function? (Not a big deal either way.) > + return true; > + > +out_err: > + state->error = true; > +out_stop: > + state->stack_info.type = STACK_TYPE_UNKNOWN; > + return false; > +} > +#endif > -- > 2.22.0 > I've tested the patch with positive results, however I didn't stress it very hard (basically only selftests). The code logic seems straightforward and correct by inspection. On a related note, do you think it would be feasible to extend (in another patchset) the reliable stack unwinding code a bit so that we could feed it pre-baked stacks ... then we could verify that the code was finding interesting scenarios. That was a passing thought I had back when Nicolai and I were debugging the ppc64le exception frame marker bug, but didn't think it worth the time/effort at the time. One more note: Using READ_ONCE_NOCHECK is probably correct here, but s390 happens to define a READ_ONCE_TASK_STACK macro which calls READ_ONCE_NOCHECK when task != current. According to the code comments, this "disables KASAN checking when reading a value from another task's stack". Is there any scenario here where we would want to use the that wrapper macro? -- Joe
