CET(Control-flow Enforcement Technology) is an upcoming Intel(R)
processor feature that blocks Return/Jump-Oriented Programming(ROP)
attacks. It provides the following capabilities to defend
against ROP/JOP style control-flow subversion attacks:

Shadow Stack (SHSTK):
  A second stack for program which is used exclusively for
  control transfer operations.

Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT):
  Code branching protection to defend against jump/call oriented
  programming.

Several new CET MSRs are defined in kernel to support CET:
  MSR_IA32_{U,S}_CET: Controls the CET settings for user
                      mode and suervisor mode respectively.

  MSR_IA32_PL{0,1,2,3}_SSP: Stores shadow stack pointers for
                            CPL-0,1,2,3 level respectively.

  MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB: Stores base address of shadow stack
                        pointer table.

Two XSAVES state bits are introduced for CET:
  IA32_XSS:[bit 11]: For saving/restoring user mode CET states
  IA32_XSS:[bit 12]: For saving/restoring supervisor mode CET states.

Six VMCS fields are introduced for CET:
  {HOST,GUEST}_S_CET: Stores CET settings for supervisor mode.
  {HOST,GUEST}_SSP: Stores shadow stack pointer for supervisor mode.
  {HOST,GUEST}_INTR_SSP_TABLE: Stores base address of shadow stack pointer
                               table.

If VM_EXIT_LOAD_HOST_CET_STATE = 1, the host's CET MSRs are restored
from below VMCS fields at VM-Exit:
  HOST_S_CET
  HOST_SSP
  HOST_INTR_SSP_TABLE

If VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_CET_STATE = 1, the guest's CET MSRs are loaded
from below VMCS fields at VM-Entry:
  GUEST_S_CET
  GUEST_SSP
  GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE

Co-developed-by: Zhang Yi Z <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi Z <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
index a39136b0d509..68bca290a203 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@
 #define VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS                   0x00800000
 #define VM_EXIT_PT_CONCEAL_PIP                 0x01000000
 #define VM_EXIT_CLEAR_IA32_RTIT_CTL            0x02000000
+#define VM_EXIT_LOAD_HOST_CET_STATE             0x10000000
 
 #define VM_EXIT_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR      0x00036dff
 
@@ -103,6 +104,7 @@
 #define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS                   0x00010000
 #define VM_ENTRY_PT_CONCEAL_PIP                        0x00020000
 #define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL            0x00040000
+#define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_CET_STATE           0x00100000
 
 #define VM_ENTRY_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR     0x000011ff
 
@@ -321,6 +323,9 @@ enum vmcs_field {
        GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS    = 0x00006822,
        GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP              = 0x00006824,
        GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP              = 0x00006826,
+       GUEST_S_CET                     = 0x00006828,
+       GUEST_SSP                       = 0x0000682a,
+       GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE            = 0x0000682c,
        HOST_CR0                        = 0x00006c00,
        HOST_CR3                        = 0x00006c02,
        HOST_CR4                        = 0x00006c04,
@@ -333,6 +338,9 @@ enum vmcs_field {
        HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP          = 0x00006c12,
        HOST_RSP                        = 0x00006c14,
        HOST_RIP                        = 0x00006c16,
+       HOST_S_CET                      = 0x00006c18,
+       HOST_SSP                        = 0x00006c1a,
+       HOST_INTR_SSP_TABLE             = 0x00006c1c
 };
 
 /*
-- 
2.17.2

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