On Wed, Jul 10, 2019 at 12:59:18PM +0200, Miroslav Benes wrote:
> The livepatch consistency model requires reliable stack tracing
> architecture support in order to work properly. In order to achieve
> this, two main issues have to be solved. First, reliable and consistent
> call chain backtracing has to be ensured. Second, the unwinder needs to
> be able to detect stack corruptions and return errors.
> 
> The "zSeries ELF Application Binary Interface Supplement" says:
> 
>   "The stack pointer points to the first word of the lowest allocated
>   stack frame. If the "back chain" is implemented this word will point to
>   the previously allocated stack frame (towards higher addresses), except
>   for the first stack frame, which shall have a back chain of zero (NULL).
>   The stack shall grow downwards, in other words towards lower addresses."
> 
> "back chain" is optional. GCC option -mbackchain enables it. Quoting
> Martin Schwidefsky [1]:

This reference footnote seems to be missing at the bottom of the patch
description.

> diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/unwind.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/unwind.h
> index d827b5b9a32c..1cc96c54169c 100644
> --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/unwind.h
> +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/unwind.h
> @@ -45,6 +45,25 @@ void __unwind_start(struct unwind_state *state, struct 
> task_struct *task,
>  bool unwind_next_frame(struct unwind_state *state);
>  unsigned long unwind_get_return_address(struct unwind_state *state);
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE
> +void __unwind_start_reliable(struct unwind_state *state,
> +                          struct task_struct *task, unsigned long sp);
> +bool unwind_next_frame_reliable(struct unwind_state *state);
> +
> +static inline void unwind_start_reliable(struct unwind_state *state,
> +                                      struct task_struct *task)
> +{
> +     unsigned long sp;
> +
> +     if (task == current)
> +             sp = current_stack_pointer();
> +     else
> +             sp = task->thread.ksp;
> +
> +     __unwind_start_reliable(state, task, sp);
> +}
> +#endif
> +

(Ah, cool, I didn't realize s390 ported the x86 unwind interfaces.  We
should look at unifying them someday.)

Why do you need _reliable() variants of the unwind interfaces?  Can the
error checking be integrated into unwind_start() and unwind_next_frame()
like they are on x86?

> +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE
> +void __unwind_start_reliable(struct unwind_state *state,
> +                          struct task_struct *task, unsigned long sp)
> +{
> +     struct stack_info *info = &state->stack_info;
> +     struct stack_frame *sf;
> +     unsigned long ip;
> +
> +     memset(state, 0, sizeof(*state));
> +     state->task = task;
> +
> +     /* Get current stack pointer and initialize stack info */
> +     if (get_stack_info_reliable(sp, task, info) ||
> +         !on_stack(info, sp, sizeof(struct stack_frame))) {
> +             /* Something is wrong with the stack pointer */
> +             info->type = STACK_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
> +             state->error = true;
> +             return;
> +     }
> +
> +     /* Get the instruction pointer from the stack frame */
> +     sf = (struct stack_frame *) sp;
> +     ip = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(sf->gprs[8]);
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER
> +     /* Decode any ftrace redirection */
> +     if (ip == (unsigned long) return_to_handler)
> +             ip = ftrace_graph_ret_addr(state->task, &state->graph_idx,
> +                                        ip, NULL);
> +#endif

The return_to_handler and ifdef checks aren't needed.  Those are done
already by the call.

Also it seems a bit odd that the kretprobes check isn't done in this
function next to the ftrace check.

> +
> +     /* Update unwind state */
> +     state->sp = sp;
> +     state->ip = ip;
> +}
> +
> +bool unwind_next_frame_reliable(struct unwind_state *state)
> +{
> +     struct stack_info *info = &state->stack_info;
> +     struct stack_frame *sf;
> +     struct pt_regs *regs;
> +     unsigned long sp, ip;
> +
> +     sf = (struct stack_frame *) state->sp;
> +     sp = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(sf->back_chain);
> +     /*
> +      * Idle tasks are special. The final back-chain points to nodat_stack.
> +      * See CALL_ON_STACK() in smp_start_secondary() callback used in
> +      * __cpu_up(). We just accept it, go to else branch and look for
> +      * pt_regs.
> +      */
> +     if (likely(sp && !(is_idle_task(state->task) &&
> +                        outside_of_stack(state, sp)))) {
> +             /* Non-zero back-chain points to the previous frame */
> +             if (unlikely(outside_of_stack(state, sp)))
> +                     goto out_err;
> +
> +             sf = (struct stack_frame *) sp;
> +             ip = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(sf->gprs[8]);
> +     } else {
> +             /* No back-chain, look for a pt_regs structure */
> +             sp = state->sp + STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD;
> +             regs = (struct pt_regs *) sp;
> +             if ((unsigned long)regs != info->end - sizeof(struct pt_regs))
> +                     goto out_err;
> +             if (!(state->task->flags & (PF_KTHREAD | PF_IDLE)) &&
> +                  !user_mode(regs))
> +                     goto out_err;
> +
> +             state->regs = regs;
> +             goto out_stop;
> +     }
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER
> +     /* Decode any ftrace redirection */
> +     if (ip == (unsigned long) return_to_handler)
> +             ip = ftrace_graph_ret_addr(state->task, &state->graph_idx,
> +                                        ip, (void *) sp);
> +#endif
> +
> +     /* Update unwind state */
> +     state->sp = sp;
> +     state->ip = ip;
> +     return true;
> +
> +out_err:
> +     state->error = true;
> +out_stop:
> +     state->stack_info.type = STACK_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
> +     return false;
> +}
> +#endif

For the _reliable() variants of the unwind interfaces, there's a lot of
code duplication with the non-reliable variants.  It looks like it would
be a lot cleaner (and easier to follow) if they were integrated.

Overall it's looking good though.

-- 
Josh

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