diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
index 175d57049168..7a9fd54a0186 100644
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2184,6 +2184,7 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be
entirely omitted.
improves system performance, but it may also
expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
Equivalent to: nopti [X86]
+ nospectre_v1 [X86]
nospectre_v2 [X86]
spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
spec_store_bypass_disable=off
[X86]
@@ -2498,9 +2499,9 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be
entirely omitted.
nohugeiomap [KNL,x86] Disable kernel huge I/O mappings.
- nospectre_v1 [PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1 (bounds
- check bypass). With this option data leaks are possible
- in the system.
+ nospectre_v1 [X86,PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1
+ (bounds check bypass). With this option data leaks are
+ possible in the system.
nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC_FSL_BOOK3E] Disable all mitigations for the
Spectre variant 2
(indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 87d663191986..81a0ada6536f 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
VERSION = 4
PATCHLEVEL = 4
-SUBLEVEL = 188
+SUBLEVEL = 189
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Blurry Fish Butt
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
index ad83c245781c..0a66f8241f18 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
@@ -41,9 +41,10 @@
/* CPU feature register tracking */
enum ftr_type {
- FTR_EXACT, /* Use a predefined safe value */
- FTR_LOWER_SAFE, /* Smaller value is safe */
- FTR_HIGHER_SAFE,/* Bigger value is safe */
+ FTR_EXACT, /* Use a predefined safe value */
+ FTR_LOWER_SAFE, /* Smaller value is safe */
+ FTR_HIGHER_SAFE, /* Bigger value is safe */
+ FTR_HIGHER_OR_ZERO_SAFE, /* Bigger value is safe, but 0 is
biggest */
};
#define FTR_STRICT true /* SANITY check strict matching required */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
index c1eddc07d996..062484d34450 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
@@ -126,10 +126,12 @@ static struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64mmfr1[] = {
};
static struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_ctr[] = {
- U_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 31, 1, 1), /* RAO */
- ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 28, 3, 0),
- U_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_HIGHER_SAFE, 24, 4, 0), /* CWG
*/
- U_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 20, 4, 0), /* ERG */
+ U_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 31, 1, 1), /* RES1 */
+ ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 30, 1, 0),
+ U_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 29, 1, 1), /* DIC */
+ U_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 28, 1, 1), /* IDC */
+ U_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_HIGHER_OR_ZERO_SAFE, 24, 4, 0),
/* CWG */
+ U_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_HIGHER_OR_ZERO_SAFE, 20, 4, 0),
/* ERG */
U_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 16, 4, 1), /* DminLine */
/*
* Linux can handle differing I-cache policies. Userspace JITs will
@@ -339,6 +341,10 @@ static s64 arm64_ftr_safe_value(struct arm64_ftr_bits
*ftrp, s64 new, s64 cur)
case FTR_LOWER_SAFE:
ret = new < cur ? new : cur;
break;
+ case FTR_HIGHER_OR_ZERO_SAFE:
+ if (!cur || !new)
+ break;
+ /* Fallthrough */
case FTR_HIGHER_SAFE:
ret = new > cur ? new : cur;
break;
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
index 3c71dd947c7b..5e24cd248728 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+#include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
+
/*
x86 function call convention, 64-bit:
@@ -199,6 +201,23 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is
built with
.byte 0xf1
.endm
+/*
+ * Mitigate Spectre v1 for conditional swapgs code paths.
+ *
+ * FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY is used in the user entry swapgs code path, to
+ * prevent a speculative swapgs when coming from kernel space.
+ *
+ * FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY is used in the kernel entry non-swapgs code path,
+ * to prevent the swapgs from getting speculatively skipped when coming from
+ * user space.
+ */
+.macro FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
+ ALTERNATIVE "", "lfence", X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER
+.endm
+.macro FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
+ ALTERNATIVE "", "lfence", X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL
+.endm
+
#else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index 375ed605c83d..afb805b0148b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -551,6 +551,7 @@ END(irq_entries_start)
* tracking that we're in kernel mode.
*/
SWAPGS
+ FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
SWITCH_KERNEL_CR3
/*
@@ -566,8 +567,10 @@ END(irq_entries_start)
#ifdef CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING
call enter_from_user_mode
#endif
-
+ jmp 2f
1:
+ FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
+2:
/*
* Save previous stack pointer, optionally switch to interrupt stack.
* irq_count is used to check if a CPU is already on an interrupt stack
@@ -1077,6 +1080,13 @@ ENTRY(paranoid_entry)
movq %rax, %cr3
2:
#endif
+ /*
+ * The above doesn't do an unconditional CR3 write, even in the PTI
+ * case. So do an lfence to prevent GS speculation, regardless of
+ * whether PTI is enabled.
+ */
+ FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
+
ret
END(paranoid_entry)
@@ -1133,12 +1143,12 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
testb $3, CS+8(%rsp)
jz .Lerror_kernelspace
-.Lerror_entry_from_usermode_swapgs:
/*
* We entered from user mode or we're pretending to have entered
* from user mode due to an IRET fault.
*/
SWAPGS
+ FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
.Lerror_entry_from_usermode_after_swapgs:
/*
@@ -1152,6 +1162,8 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
#endif
ret
+.Lerror_entry_done_lfence:
+ FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
.Lerror_entry_done:
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
ret
@@ -1170,14 +1182,16 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
cmpq %rax, RIP+8(%rsp)
je .Lbstep_iret
cmpq $gs_change, RIP+8(%rsp)
- jne .Lerror_entry_done
+ jne .Lerror_entry_done_lfence
/*
* hack: gs_change can fail with user gsbase. If this happens, fix up
* gsbase and proceed. We'll fix up the exception and land in
* gs_change's error handler with kernel gsbase.
*/
- jmp .Lerror_entry_from_usermode_swapgs
+ SWAPGS
+ FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
+ jmp .Lerror_entry_done
.Lbstep_iret:
/* Fix truncated RIP */
@@ -1190,6 +1204,7 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
* Switch to kernel gsbase:
*/
SWAPGS
+ FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
/*
* Pretend that the exception came from user mode: set up pt_regs
@@ -1286,6 +1301,7 @@ ENTRY(nmi)
* to switch CR3 here.
*/
cld
+ FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
movq %rsp, %rdx
movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp
pushq 5*8(%rdx) /* pt_regs->ss */
@@ -1574,6 +1590,7 @@ end_repeat_nmi:
movq %rax, %cr3
2:
#endif
+ FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
/* paranoidentry do_nmi, 0; without TRACE_IRQS_OFF */
call do_nmi
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index d9f7d1770e98..113cb01ebaac 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -192,17 +192,17 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE ( 7*32+ 8) /* AMD HW-PState */
#define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */
+#define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER ( 7*32+10) /* "" LFENCE in user entry
SWAPGS path */
+#define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL ( 7*32+11) /* "" LFENCE in
kernel entry SWAPGS path */
+
#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation
for Spectre variant 2 */
#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* "" AMD Retpoline mitigation
for Spectre variant 2 */
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT ( 7*32+15) /* Intel Processor Trace */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* "" Fill RSB on context switches */
-
#define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL ( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is
implemented */
#define X86_FEATURE_SSBD ( 7*32+17) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable
*/
-/* Because the ALTERNATIVE scheme is for members of the X86_FEATURE club... */
-#define X86_FEATURE_KAISER ( 7*32+31) /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION w/o
nokaiser */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* "" Fill RSB on context switches */
#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB ( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction
Barrier enabled*/
#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW ( 7*32+22) /* "" Use IBRS during
runtime firmware calls */
@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN ( 7*32+28) /* "" CPU is AMD family 0x17
(Zen) */
#define X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV ( 7*32+29) /* "" L1TF workaround PTE
inversion */
#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED ( 7*32+30) /* Enhanced IBRS */
+#define X86_FEATURE_KAISER ( 7*32+31) /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION w/o
nokaiser */
/* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
#define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
@@ -338,5 +339,6 @@
#define X86_BUG_L1TF X86_BUG(18) /* CPU is affected by L1 Terminal
Fault */
#define X86_BUG_MDS X86_BUG(19) /* CPU is affected by
Microarchitectural data sampling */
#define X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY X86_BUG(20) /* CPU is only affected by the
MSDBS variant of BUG_MDS */
+#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS X86_BUG(21) /* CPU is affected by speculation
through SWAPGS */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index ab2df0f9ac45..917c63aa1599 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#include <asm/intel-family.h>
#include <asm/e820.h>
+static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
@@ -87,17 +88,11 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
- /* Select the proper spectre mitigation before patching alternatives */
+ /* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */
+ spectre_v1_select_mitigation();
spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
-
- /*
- * Select proper mitigation for any exposure to the Speculative Store
- * Bypass vulnerability.
- */
ssb_select_mitigation();
-
l1tf_select_mitigation();
-
mds_select_mitigation();
arch_smt_update();
@@ -251,6 +246,98 @@ static int __init mds_cmdline(char *str)
}
early_param("mds", mds_cmdline);
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V1 : " fmt
+
+enum spectre_v1_mitigation {
+ SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE,
+ SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO,
+};
+
+static enum spectre_v1_mitigation spectre_v1_mitigation =
+ SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO;
+
+static const char * const spectre_v1_strings[] = {
+ [SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable: __user pointer sanitization
and usercopy barriers only; no swapgs barriers",
+ [SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO] = "Mitigation: usercopy/swapgs barriers
and __user pointer sanitization",
+};
+
+/*
+ * Does SMAP provide full mitigation against speculative kernel access to
+ * userspace?
+ */
+static bool smap_works_speculatively(void)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMAP))
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * On CPUs which are vulnerable to Meltdown, SMAP does not
+ * prevent speculative access to user data in the L1 cache.
+ * Consider SMAP to be non-functional as a mitigation on these
+ * CPUs.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+ spectre_v1_mitigation = SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (spectre_v1_mitigation == SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO) {
+ /*
+ * With Spectre v1, a user can speculatively control either
+ * path of a conditional swapgs with a user-controlled GS
+ * value. The mitigation is to add lfences to both code paths.
+ *
+ * If FSGSBASE is enabled, the user can put a kernel address in
+ * GS, in which case SMAP provides no protection.
+ *
+ * [ NOTE: Don't check for X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE until the
+ * FSGSBASE enablement patches have been merged. ]
+ *
+ * If FSGSBASE is disabled, the user can only put a user space
+ * address in GS. That makes an attack harder, but still
+ * possible if there's no SMAP protection.
+ */
+ if (!smap_works_speculatively()) {
+ /*
+ * Mitigation can be provided from SWAPGS itself or
+ * PTI as the CR3 write in the Meltdown mitigation
+ * is serializing.
+ *
+ * If neither is there, mitigate with an LFENCE to
+ * stop speculation through swapgs.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KAISER))
+
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER);
+
+ /*
+ * Enable lfences in the kernel entry (non-swapgs)
+ * paths, to prevent user entry from speculatively
+ * skipping swapgs.
+ */
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL);
+ }
+ }
+
+ pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v1_strings[spectre_v1_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static int __init nospectre_v1_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+ spectre_v1_mitigation = SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE;
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline);
+
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt
@@ -1154,7 +1241,7 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct
device_attribute *attr
break;
case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1:
- return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer
sanitization\n");
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s\n",
spectre_v1_strings[spectre_v1_mitigation]);
case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2:
return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 4bce77bc7e61..3965235973c8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -853,6 +853,7 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86
*c)
#define NO_L1TF BIT(3)
#define NO_MDS BIT(4)
#define MSBDS_ONLY BIT(5)
+#define NO_SWAPGS BIT(6)
#define VULNWL(_vendor, _family, _model, _whitelist) \
{ X86_VENDOR_##_vendor, _family, _model, X86_FEATURE_ANY, _whitelist }
@@ -876,29 +877,37 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id
cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL, NO_SPECULATION),
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL_MID, NO_SPECULATION),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_X, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
- VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
- VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY |
NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_X, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY |
NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY |
NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY |
NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY |
NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY |
NO_SWAPGS),
VULNWL_INTEL(CORE_YONAH, NO_SSB),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID, NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID, NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY |
NO_SWAPGS),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_X, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_X, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS),
+
+ /*
+ * Technically, swapgs isn't serializing on AMD (despite it previously
+ * being documented as such in the APM). But according to AMD, %gs is
+ * updated non-speculatively, and the issuing of %gs-relative memory
+ * operands will be blocked until the %gs update completes, which is
+ * good enough for our purposes.
+ */
/* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */
- VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
- VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
- VULNWL_AMD(0x11, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
- VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS |
NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS |
NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x11, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS |
NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS |
NO_SWAPGS),
/* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */
- VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
+ VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS |
NO_SWAPGS),
{}
};
@@ -935,6 +944,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY);
}
+ if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS);
+
if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
return;
diff --git a/block/blk-core.c b/block/blk-core.c
index 50d77c90070d..7662f97dded6 100644
--- a/block/blk-core.c
+++ b/block/blk-core.c
@@ -870,6 +870,7 @@ blk_init_allocated_queue(struct request_queue *q,
request_fn_proc *rfn,
fail:
blk_free_flush_queue(q->fq);
+ q->fq = NULL;
return NULL;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(blk_init_allocated_queue);
diff --git a/drivers/atm/iphase.c b/drivers/atm/iphase.c
index 7d00f2994738..860a33a90ebf 100644
--- a/drivers/atm/iphase.c
+++ b/drivers/atm/iphase.c
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
#include <asm/byteorder.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/jiffies.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include "iphase.h"
#include "suni.h"
#define swap_byte_order(x) (((x & 0xff) << 8) | ((x & 0xff00) >> 8))
@@ -2755,8 +2756,11 @@ static int ia_ioctl(struct atm_dev *dev, unsigned int
cmd, void __user *arg)
}
if (copy_from_user(&ia_cmds, arg, sizeof ia_cmds)) return -EFAULT;
board = ia_cmds.status;
- if ((board < 0) || (board > iadev_count))
- board = 0;
+
+ if ((board < 0) || (board > iadev_count))
+ board = 0;
+ board = array_index_nospec(board, iadev_count + 1);
+
iadev = ia_dev[board];
switch (ia_cmds.cmd) {
case MEMDUMP:
diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h b/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h
index 00d8366a614e..e1807296a1a0 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h
@@ -470,6 +470,7 @@
#define USB_PRODUCT_ID_HP_LOGITECH_OEM_USB_OPTICAL_MOUSE_0A4A 0x0a4a
#define USB_PRODUCT_ID_HP_LOGITECH_OEM_USB_OPTICAL_MOUSE_0B4A 0x0b4a
#define USB_PRODUCT_ID_HP_PIXART_OEM_USB_OPTICAL_MOUSE 0x134a
+#define USB_PRODUCT_ID_HP_PIXART_OEM_USB_OPTICAL_MOUSE_0641 0x0641
#define USB_VENDOR_ID_HUION 0x256c
#define USB_DEVICE_ID_HUION_TABLET 0x006e
diff --git a/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-quirks.c b/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-quirks.c
index c9a11315493b..5dcdfdca4fd7 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-quirks.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-quirks.c
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ static const struct hid_blacklist {
{ USB_VENDOR_ID_HP,
USB_PRODUCT_ID_HP_LOGITECH_OEM_USB_OPTICAL_MOUSE_0A4A, HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
{ USB_VENDOR_ID_HP,
USB_PRODUCT_ID_HP_LOGITECH_OEM_USB_OPTICAL_MOUSE_0B4A, HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
{ USB_VENDOR_ID_HP, USB_PRODUCT_ID_HP_PIXART_OEM_USB_OPTICAL_MOUSE,
HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
+ { USB_VENDOR_ID_HP,
USB_PRODUCT_ID_HP_PIXART_OEM_USB_OPTICAL_MOUSE_0641, HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
{ USB_VENDOR_ID_LOGITECH, USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_C077,
HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
{ USB_VENDOR_ID_LOGITECH, USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_KEYBOARD_G710_PLUS,
HID_QUIRK_NOGET },
{ USB_VENDOR_ID_LOGITECH, USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_MOUSE_C01A,
HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c
b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c
index 4dc5e12dbfce..13de5ce3facf 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c
@@ -1957,7 +1957,7 @@ u16 bnx2x_select_queue(struct net_device *dev, struct
sk_buff *skb,
}
/* select a non-FCoE queue */
- return fallback(dev, skb) % (BNX2X_NUM_ETH_QUEUES(bp) * bp->max_cos);
+ return fallback(dev, skb) % (BNX2X_NUM_ETH_QUEUES(bp));
}
void bnx2x_set_num_queues(struct bnx2x *bp)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/main.c
b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/main.c
index 7c42be586be8..35bcc6dbada9 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/main.c
@@ -778,7 +778,7 @@ static void mlx5_unregister_device(struct mlx5_core_dev
*dev)
struct mlx5_interface *intf;
mutex_lock(&intf_mutex);
- list_for_each_entry(intf, &intf_list, list)
+ list_for_each_entry_reverse(intf, &intf_list, list)
mlx5_remove_device(intf, priv);
list_del(&priv->dev_list);
mutex_unlock(&intf_mutex);
diff --git a/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c b/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c
index 02327e6c4819..39976892b312 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c
@@ -1152,6 +1152,9 @@ static const struct proto_ops pppoe_ops = {
.recvmsg = pppoe_recvmsg,
.mmap = sock_no_mmap,
.ioctl = pppox_ioctl,
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ .compat_ioctl = pppox_compat_ioctl,
+#endif
};
static const struct pppox_proto pppoe_proto = {
diff --git a/drivers/net/ppp/pppox.c b/drivers/net/ppp/pppox.c
index 0e1b30622477..011fbd10cb73 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ppp/pppox.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ppp/pppox.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/netdevice.h>
#include <linux/net.h>
@@ -103,6 +104,18 @@ int pppox_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(pppox_ioctl);
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+int pppox_compat_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long
arg)
+{
+ if (cmd == PPPOEIOCSFWD32)
+ cmd = PPPOEIOCSFWD;
+
+ return pppox_ioctl(sock, cmd, (unsigned long)compat_ptr(arg));
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(pppox_compat_ioctl);
+#endif
+
static int pppox_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
int kern)
{
diff --git a/drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c b/drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c
index 53c1f2bd0f24..19d0692a2d2f 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c
@@ -674,6 +674,9 @@ static const struct proto_ops pptp_ops = {
.recvmsg = sock_no_recvmsg,
.mmap = sock_no_mmap,
.ioctl = pppox_ioctl,
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ .compat_ioctl = pppox_compat_ioctl,
+#endif
};
static const struct pppox_proto pppox_pptp_proto = {
diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi-bcm2835.c b/drivers/spi/spi-bcm2835.c
index 1a1368f5863c..25daebd6f410 100644
--- a/drivers/spi/spi-bcm2835.c
+++ b/drivers/spi/spi-bcm2835.c
@@ -554,7 +554,8 @@ static int bcm2835_spi_transfer_one(struct spi_master
*master,
bcm2835_wr(bs, BCM2835_SPI_CLK, cdiv);
/* handle all the 3-wire mode */
- if ((spi->mode & SPI_3WIRE) && (tfr->rx_buf))
+ if (spi->mode & SPI_3WIRE && tfr->rx_buf &&
+ tfr->rx_buf != master->dummy_rx)
cs |= BCM2835_SPI_CS_REN;
else
cs &= ~BCM2835_SPI_CS_REN;
diff --git a/fs/compat_ioctl.c b/fs/compat_ioctl.c
index a52ca5cba015..5af973621c73 100644
--- a/fs/compat_ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/compat_ioctl.c
@@ -1016,9 +1016,6 @@ COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(PPPIOCDISCONN)
COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(PPPIOCATTCHAN)
COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(PPPIOCGCHAN)
COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(PPPIOCGL2TPSTATS)
-/* PPPOX */
-COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(PPPOEIOCSFWD)
-COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(PPPOEIOCDFWD)
/* ppdev */
COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(PPSETMODE)
COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(PPRSTATUS)
diff --git a/include/linux/if_pppox.h b/include/linux/if_pppox.h
index b49cf923becc..93ef387eadb1 100644
--- a/include/linux/if_pppox.h
+++ b/include/linux/if_pppox.h
@@ -84,6 +84,9 @@ extern int register_pppox_proto(int proto_num, const struct
pppox_proto *pp);
extern void unregister_pppox_proto(int proto_num);
extern void pppox_unbind_sock(struct sock *sk);/* delete ppp-channel binding */
extern int pppox_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long
arg);
+extern int pppox_compat_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned
long arg);
+
+#define PPPOEIOCSFWD32 _IOW(0xB1 ,0, compat_size_t)
/* PPPoX socket states */
enum {
diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h
index 77438a8406ec..0410fd29d569 100644
--- a/include/net/tcp.h
+++ b/include/net/tcp.h
@@ -1526,6 +1526,23 @@ static inline void tcp_check_send_head(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb_unli
tcp_sk(sk)->highest_sack = NULL;
}
+static inline struct sk_buff *tcp_rtx_queue_head(const struct sock *sk)
+{
+ struct sk_buff *skb = tcp_write_queue_head(sk);
+
+ if (skb == tcp_send_head(sk))
+ skb = NULL;
+
+ return skb;
+}
+
+static inline struct sk_buff *tcp_rtx_queue_tail(const struct sock *sk)
+{
+ struct sk_buff *skb = tcp_send_head(sk);
+
+ return skb ? tcp_write_queue_prev(sk, skb) : tcp_write_queue_tail(sk);
+}
+
static inline void __tcp_add_write_queue_tail(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff
*skb)
{
__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue, skb);
diff --git a/net/bridge/br_vlan.c b/net/bridge/br_vlan.c
index 1394da63614a..a7953962112a 100644
--- a/net/bridge/br_vlan.c
+++ b/net/bridge/br_vlan.c
@@ -580,6 +580,11 @@ void br_vlan_flush(struct net_bridge *br)
ASSERT_RTNL();
+ /* delete auto-added default pvid local fdb before flushing vlans
+ * otherwise it will be leaked on bridge device init failure
+ */
+ br_fdb_delete_by_port(br, NULL, 0, 1);
+
vg = br_vlan_group(br);
__vlan_flush(vg);
RCU_INIT_POINTER(br->vlgrp, NULL);
diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c
index db5345f5f7b0..152e1e6316e6 100644
--- a/net/core/dev.c
+++ b/net/core/dev.c
@@ -7768,6 +7768,8 @@ static void __net_exit default_device_exit(struct net
*net)
/* Push remaining network devices to init_net */
snprintf(fb_name, IFNAMSIZ, "dev%d", dev->ifindex);
+ if (__dev_get_by_name(&init_net, fb_name))
+ snprintf(fb_name, IFNAMSIZ, "dev%%d");
err = dev_change_net_namespace(dev, &init_net, fb_name);
if (err) {
pr_emerg("%s: failed to move %s to init_net: %d\n",
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
index 53edd60fd381..76ffce0c18ae 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
@@ -1151,6 +1151,7 @@ int tcp_fragment(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
u32 len,
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *buff;
int nsize, old_factor;
+ long limit;
int nlen;
u8 flags;
@@ -1161,7 +1162,15 @@ int tcp_fragment(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
u32 len,
if (nsize < 0)
nsize = 0;
- if (unlikely((sk->sk_wmem_queued >> 1) > sk->sk_sndbuf + 0x20000)) {
+ /* tcp_sendmsg() can overshoot sk_wmem_queued by one full size skb.
+ * We need some allowance to not penalize applications setting small
+ * SO_SNDBUF values.
+ * Also allow first and last skb in retransmit queue to be split.
+ */
+ limit = sk->sk_sndbuf + 2 * SKB_TRUESIZE(GSO_MAX_SIZE);
+ if (unlikely((sk->sk_wmem_queued >> 1) > limit &&
+ skb != tcp_rtx_queue_head(sk) &&
+ skb != tcp_rtx_queue_tail(sk))) {
NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPWQUEUETOOBIG);
return -ENOMEM;
}
diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c
index 2764c4bd072c..d3f1222c1a8c 100644
--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c
@@ -1805,6 +1805,9 @@ static const struct proto_ops pppol2tp_ops = {
.recvmsg = pppol2tp_recvmsg,
.mmap = sock_no_mmap,
.ioctl = pppox_ioctl,
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ .compat_ioctl = pppox_compat_ioctl,
+#endif
};
static const struct pppox_proto pppol2tp_proto = {
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_acct.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_acct.c
index 088e8da06b00..0f3cb410e42e 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_acct.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_acct.c
@@ -97,6 +97,8 @@ nfnl_acct_new(struct sock *nfnl, struct sk_buff *skb,
return -EINVAL;
if (flags & NFACCT_F_OVERQUOTA)
return -EINVAL;
+ if ((flags & NFACCT_F_QUOTA) && !tb[NFACCT_QUOTA])
+ return -EINVAL;
size += sizeof(u64);
}
diff --git a/net/sched/sch_codel.c b/net/sched/sch_codel.c
index 9b7e2980ee5c..3bc5dec3b17b 100644
--- a/net/sched/sch_codel.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_codel.c
@@ -68,7 +68,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *dequeue(struct codel_vars *vars,
struct Qdisc *sch)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = __skb_dequeue(&sch->q);
- prefetch(&skb->end); /* we'll need skb_shinfo() */
+ if (skb)
+ prefetch(&skb->end); /* we'll need skb_shinfo() */
return skb;
}
diff --git a/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c b/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
index 9a65664f749c..d2bf92e71150 100644
--- a/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
+++ b/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ struct tipc_nl_compat_msg {
int rep_type;
int rep_size;
int req_type;
+ int req_size;
struct net *net;
struct sk_buff *rep;
struct tlv_desc *req;
@@ -252,7 +253,8 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_dumpit(struct
tipc_nl_compat_cmd_dump *cmd,
int err;
struct sk_buff *arg;
- if (msg->req_type && !TLV_CHECK_TYPE(msg->req, msg->req_type))
+ if (msg->req_type && (!msg->req_size ||
+ !TLV_CHECK_TYPE(msg->req, msg->req_type)))
return -EINVAL;
msg->rep = tipc_tlv_alloc(msg->rep_size);
@@ -345,7 +347,8 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_doit(struct
tipc_nl_compat_cmd_doit *cmd,
{
int err;
- if (msg->req_type && !TLV_CHECK_TYPE(msg->req, msg->req_type))
+ if (msg->req_type && (!msg->req_size ||
+ !TLV_CHECK_TYPE(msg->req, msg->req_type)))
return -EINVAL;
err = __tipc_nl_compat_doit(cmd, msg);
@@ -1192,8 +1195,8 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_recv(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct genl_info *info)
goto send;
}
- len = nlmsg_attrlen(req_nlh, GENL_HDRLEN + TIPC_GENL_HDRLEN);
- if (!len || !TLV_OK(msg.req, len)) {
+ msg.req_size = nlmsg_attrlen(req_nlh, GENL_HDRLEN + TIPC_GENL_HDRLEN);
+ if (msg.req_size && !TLV_OK(msg.req, msg.req_size)) {
msg.rep = tipc_get_err_tlv(TIPC_CFG_NOT_SUPPORTED);
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto send;
