The KEXEC_CMDLINE hook function only supports the pcr conditional. Make
this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors don't assume that
other conditionals are supported.

Since KEXEC_CMDLINE's inception, ima_match_rules() has always returned
true on any loaded KEXEC_CMDLINE rule without any consideration for
other conditionals present in the rule. Make it clear that pcr is the
only supported KEXEC_CMDLINE conditional by returning an error during
policy load.

An example of why this is a problem can be explained with the following
rule:

 dont_measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE obj_type=foo_t

An IMA policy author would have assumed that rule is valid because the
parser accepted it but the result was that measurements for all
KEXEC_CMDLINE operations would be disabled.

Fixes: b0935123a183 ("IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command 
line arguments")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
---

* v2
  - Added Mimi's Reviewed-by

 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c 
b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 166124d67774..676d5557af1a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -343,6 +343,17 @@ static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry 
*entry)
        return 0;
 }
 
+static bool ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
+{
+       int i;
+
+       for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
+               if (entry->lsm[i].args_p)
+                       return true;
+
+       return false;
+}
+
 /*
  * The LSM policy can be reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring
  * to the old, stale LSM policy.  Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect
@@ -993,6 +1004,16 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry 
*entry)
                case POLICY_CHECK:
                        break;
                case KEXEC_CMDLINE:
+                       if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
+                               return false;
+
+                       if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_PCR))
+                               return false;
+
+                       if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
+                               return false;
+
+                       break;
                case KEY_CHECK:
                        if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
                                return false;
-- 
2.25.1

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