On 6/26/20 3:39 PM, Tyler Hicks wrote:
Take the properties of the kexec kernel's inode and the current task
ownership into consideration when matching a KEXEC_CMDLINE operation to
the rules in the IMA policy. This allows for some uniformity when
writing IMA policy rules for KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,
and KEXEC_CMDLINE operations.
Prior to this patch, it was not possible to write a set of rules like
this:
dont_measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK obj_type=foo_t
dont_measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK obj_type=foo_t
dont_measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE obj_type=foo_t
measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK
measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK
measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE
The inode information associated with the kernel being loaded by a
kexec_kernel_load(2) syscall can now be included in the decision to
measure or not
Additonally, the uid, euid, and subj_* conditionals can also now be
used in KEXEC_CMDLINE rules. There was no technical reason as to why
those conditionals weren't being considered previously other than
ima_match_rules() didn't have a valid inode to use so it immediately
bailed out for KEXEC_CMDLINE operations rather than going through the
full list of conditional comparisons.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Biederman <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
---
* v2
- Moved the inode parameter of process_buffer_measurement() to be the
first parameter so that it more closely matches process_masurement()
include/linux/ima.h | 4 ++--
kernel/kexec_file.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 23 +++++++++++++++-----
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 17 +++++----------
security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c | 2 +-
9 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <[email protected]>
