Hi Archie,
>>>>>>>>> When receiving connection, we only check whether the link has been
>>>>>>>>> encrypted, but not the encryption key size of the link.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> This patch adds check for encryption key size, and reject L2CAP
>>>>>>>>> connection which size is below the specified threshold (default 7)
>>>>>>>>> with security block.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Here is some btmon trace.
>>>>>>>>> @ MGMT Event: New Link Key (0x0009) plen 26 {0x0001} [hci0]
>>>>>>>>> 5.847722
>>>>>>>>> Store hint: No (0x00)
>>>>>>>>> BR/EDR Address: 38:00:25:F7:F1:B0 (OUI 38-00-25)
>>>>>>>>> Key type: Unauthenticated Combination key from P-192 (0x04)
>>>>>>>>> Link key: 7bf2f68c81305d63a6b0ee2c5a7a34bc
>>>>>>>>> PIN length: 0
>>>>>>>>>> HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4 #29 [hci0] 5.871537
>>>>>>>>> Status: Success (0x00)
>>>>>>>>> Handle: 256
>>>>>>>>> Encryption: Enabled with E0 (0x01)
>>>>>>>>> < HCI Command: Read Encryp... (0x05|0x0008) plen 2 #30 [hci0]
>>>>>>>>> 5.871609
>>>>>>>>> Handle: 256
>>>>>>>>>> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 7 #31 [hci0] 5.872524
>>>>>>>>> Read Encryption Key Size (0x05|0x0008) ncmd 1
>>>>>>>>> Status: Success (0x00)
>>>>>>>>> Handle: 256
>>>>>>>>> Key size: 3
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> ////// WITHOUT PATCH //////
>>>>>>>>>> ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 12 #42 [hci0] 5.895023
>>>>>>>>> L2CAP: Connection Request (0x02) ident 3 len 4
>>>>>>>>> PSM: 4097 (0x1001)
>>>>>>>>> Source CID: 64
>>>>>>>>> < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 16 #43 [hci0]
>>>>>>>>> 5.895213
>>>>>>>>> L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 3 len 8
>>>>>>>>> Destination CID: 64
>>>>>>>>> Source CID: 64
>>>>>>>>> Result: Connection successful (0x0000)
>>>>>>>>> Status: No further information available (0x0000)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> ////// WITH PATCH //////
>>>>>>>>>> ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 12 #42 [hci0] 4.887024
>>>>>>>>> L2CAP: Connection Request (0x02) ident 3 len 4
>>>>>>>>> PSM: 4097 (0x1001)
>>>>>>>>> Source CID: 64
>>>>>>>>> < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 16 #43 [hci0]
>>>>>>>>> 4.887127
>>>>>>>>> L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 3 len 8
>>>>>>>>> Destination CID: 0
>>>>>>>>> Source CID: 64
>>>>>>>>> Result: Connection refused - security block (0x0003)
>>>>>>>>> Status: No further information available (0x0000)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Archie Pusaka <[email protected]>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Changes in v3:
>>>>>>>>> * Move the check to hci_conn_check_link_mode()
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Changes in v2:
>>>>>>>>> * Add btmon trace to the commit message
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c | 4 ++++
>>>>>>>>> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
>>>>>>>>> index 9832f8445d43..89085fac797c 100644
>>>>>>>>> --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
>>>>>>>>> +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
>>>>>>>>> @@ -1348,6 +1348,10 @@ int hci_conn_check_link_mode(struct hci_conn
>>>>>>>>> *conn)
>>>>>>>>> !test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags))
>>>>>>>>> return 0;
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> + if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags) &&
>>>>>>>>> + conn->enc_key_size < conn->hdev->min_enc_key_size)
>>>>>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>>> return 1;
>>>>>>>>> }
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I am a bit concerned since we had that check and I on purpose moved
>>>>>>>> it. See commit 693cd8ce3f88 for the change where I removed and commit
>>>>>>>> d5bb334a8e17 where I initially added it.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Naively adding the check in that location caused a major regression
>>>>>>>> with Bluetooth 2.0 devices. This makes me a bit reluctant to re-add it
>>>>>>>> here since I restructured the whole change to check the key size a
>>>>>>>> different location.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I have tried this patch (both v2 and v3) to connect with a Bluetooth
>>>>>>> 2.0 device, it doesn't have any connection problem.
>>>>>>> I suppose because in the original patch (d5bb334a8e17), there is no
>>>>>>> check for the HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT flag.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> while that might be the case, I am still super careful. Especially also
>>>>>> in conjunction with the email / patch from Alex trying to add just
>>>>>> another encryption key size check. If we really need them or even both,
>>>>>> we have to audit the whole code since I must have clearly missed
>>>>>> something when adding the KNOB fix.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Now I have to ask, are you running an upstream kernel with both
>>>>>>>> commits above that address KNOB vulnerability?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Actually no, I haven't heard of KNOB vulnerability before.
>>>>>>> This patch is written for qualification purposes, specifically to pass
>>>>>>> GAP/SEC/SEM/BI-05-C to BI-08-C.
>>>>>>> However, it sounds like it could also prevent some KNOB vulnerability
>>>>>>> as a bonus.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That part worries me since there should be no gaps that allows an
>>>>>> encryption key size downgrade if our side supports Read Encryption Key
>>>>>> Size.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We really have to ensure that any L2CAP communication is stalled until
>>>>>> we have all information from HCI connection setup that we need. So maybe
>>>>>> the change Alex did would work as well, or as I mentioned put any L2CAP
>>>>>> connection request as pending so that the validation happens in one
>>>>>> place.
>>>>>
>>>>> I think Alex and I are solving the same problem, either one of the
>>>>> patches should be enough.
>>>>>
>>>>> Here is my test method using BlueZ as both the IUT and the lower test.
>>>>> (1) Copy the bluez/test/test-profile python script to IUT and lower test.
>>>>> (2) Assign a fake service server to IUT
>>>>> python test-profile -u 00001fff-0000-1000-2000-123456789abc -s -P 4097
>>>>> (3) Assign a fake service client to lower test
>>>>> python test-profile -u 00001fff-0000-1000-2000-123456789abc -c
>>>>> (4) Make the lower test accept weak encryption key
>>>>> echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/bluetooth/hci0/min_encrypt_key_size
>>>>> (5) Enable ssp and disable sc on lower test
>>>>> btmgmt ssp on
>>>>> btmgmt sc off
>>>>> (6) Set lower test encryption key size to 1
>>>>> (7) initiate connection from lower test
>>>>> dbus-send --system --print-reply --dest=org.bluez
>>>>> /org/bluez/hci0/dev_<IUT> org.bluez.Device1.ConnectProfile
>>>>> string:00001fff-0000-1000-2000-123456789abc
>>>>>
>>>>> After MITM authentication, IUT will incorrectly accept the connection,
>>>>> even though the encryption key used is less than the one specified in
>>>>> IUT's min_encrypt_key_size.
>>>>
>>>> I almost assumed that you two are chasing the same issue here. Problem is
>>>> I really don’t yet know where to correctly put that encryption key size
>>>> check.
>>>>
>>>> There is one case in l2cap_connect() that will not respond with
>>>> L2CAP_CR_PEND.
>>>>
>>>> /* Force pending result for AMP controllers.
>>>> * The connection will succeed after the
>>>> * physical link is up.
>>>> */
>>>> if (amp_id == AMP_ID_BREDR) {
>>>> l2cap_state_change(chan, BT_CONFIG);
>>>> result = L2CAP_CR_SUCCESS;
>>>> } else {
>>>> l2cap_state_change(chan,
>>>> BT_CONNECT2);
>>>> result = L2CAP_CR_PEND;
>>>> }
>>>> status = L2CAP_CS_NO_INFO;
>>>>
>>>> Most services will actually use FLAG_DEFER_SETUP and then you also don’t
>>>> run into this issue since at this stage the response is L2CAP_CR_PEND as
>>>> well.
>>>>
>>>> One question we should answer is if we just always return L2CAP_CR_PEND or
>>>> if we actually add the check for the encryption key size here as well.
>>>> This has always been a shortcut to avoid an unneeded round-trip if all
>>>> information are present. Question really is if all information are present
>>>> or if this is just pure luck. I don’t see a guarantee that the encryption
>>>> key size has been read in any of your patches.
>>>>
>>>> Everywhere else in the code we have this sequence of checks:
>>>>
>>>> l2cap_chan_check_security()
>>>>
>>>> l2cap_check_enc_key_size()
>>>>
>>>> This is generally how l2cap_do_start() or l2cap_conn_start() do their job.
>>>> So we might have to restructure l2cap_connect() a little bit for following
>>>> the same principle.
>>>>
>>>> Anyhow, before do this, can we try if this patch fixes this as well and
>>>> check the btmon trace for it:
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
>>>> index 1ab27b90ddcb..88e4c1292b98 100644
>>>> --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
>>>> +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
>>>> @@ -4156,17 +4156,8 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_connect(struct
>>>> l2cap_conn *conn,
>>>> status = L2CAP_CS_AUTHOR_PEND;
>>>> chan->ops->defer(chan);
>>>> } else {
>>>> - /* Force pending result for AMP
>>>> controllers.
>>>> - * The connection will succeed after the
>>>> - * physical link is up.
>>>> - */
>>>> - if (amp_id == AMP_ID_BREDR) {
>>>> - l2cap_state_change(chan,
>>>> BT_CONFIG);
>>>> - result = L2CAP_CR_SUCCESS;
>>>> - } else {
>>>> - l2cap_state_change(chan,
>>>> BT_CONNECT2);
>>>> - result = L2CAP_CR_PEND;
>>>> - }
>>>> + l2cap_state_change(chan, BT_CONNECT2);
>>>> + result = L2CAP_CR_PEND;
>>>> status = L2CAP_CS_NO_INFO;
>>>> }
>>>> } else {
>>>>
>>>> If this fixes your issue and puts the encryption key size check back in
>>>> play, then I just have to think about on how to fix this.
>>>
>>> That patch alone doesn't fix the issue I have. By applying it, the
>>> only difference I am aware of is we would first reply "connection
>>> pending" to the initial SDP request of the peripheral, instead of just
>>> "connection successful". Subsequent L2CAP connections go to the
>>> FLAG_DEFER_SETUP branch just a tad above the change in the patch, so
>>> they are not affected at all.
>>
>> but SDP is especially allowed to be unencrypted. In conclusion that also
>> means that a negotiated key size of 1 would be acceptable. It is for
>> everything except PSM 1 where we have to ensure that it is a) encrypted and
>> b) has a minimum key size.
>>
>
> Sorry for being unclear.
> Under my test setup, the peripheral will initiate SDP connection, then
> try to encrypt the link (with encryption key size < 7), then try to
> enable MITM protection, then connect to PSM 4097 (but could be any
> other PSM as well).
> Without any patch, the connection to SDP will immediately get
> "connection successful", and the connection to PSM 4097 will get
> "authorization pending". Once the user authorizes it, it will
> successfully connect.
> With your patch, the connection to SDP will get "connection pending",
> then shortly after followed by "connection successful". The rest just
> stay the same.
>
> Therefore, this doesn't solve the original problem.
hmmm, I am still trying to follow the code flow with this. I have a bit the
feeling that you and Alex have uncovered some mistake in the flow. There seems
to be some hole somewhere. Right now I am unsure on how to fix it.
Have you tried Alex’s patch. Does it work for you as well.
So I am bit reluctant to just associate being encrypted with the having the min
encryption key size since as I stated, that requirement really only applies to
non-SDP connection. The spec lists a few service types that are exempt from the
encryption requirement. And of course before Bluetooth 2.1 that requirement
never existed in the first place.
I have the feeling that Alex’s patch is looking at the right spot to fix this.
However I have to dig deeper to make sure it is truly correct.
Regards
Marcel
