On Thu, Nov 29, 2007 at 03:56:28PM -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > Yes, most of these schemes *can* be bypassed because some malicious code does > a > mmap() or similar trick. But what is being overlooked here is that in most > cases, what is *desired* is a way to filter things being handled by *non* > malicious code. Yeah, sure, a shar archive can contain a binary that does > evil > things - but if we stop /bin/cp from copying the file that has the evil in it, > it's a non-issue.
Then all you need is scan-on-commit with commit-on-close. Which requires no changes of anything that would run in kernel mode and no bothering with LSM whatsoever. Incidentally, I would really love to see the threat profile we are talking about. I have some impressions in that area, but I would rather keep them to myself for now - I really want to see the answers. - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
