Hello. David Wagner wrote: > If the attacker gets full administrator-level access on your machine, > there are a gazillion ways the attacker can prevent other admins from > logging on. This patch can't prevent that. It sounds like this patch > is trying to solve a fundamentally unsolveable problem.
Please be aware that I'm saying "if this filesystem is used with MAC". Without MAC, an attacker who got root privilege can do whatever he/she want to do. But with MAC, an attacker who got root privilege can't do whatever he/she want to do. Only actions permitted by MAC's policy are permitted for the attacker who got root privilege. I'm not saying that "this filesystem can prevent attackers from mounting other filesystem over this filesystem", nor "this filesystem can prevent attackers from executing /sbin/iptables or /usr/bin/passwd". They are MAC's business. What this filesystem can do is "guarantee filename and its attribute". If MAC(such as SELinux, TOMOYO Linux) allows attackers to "mount other filesystem over this filesystem", this filesystem is no longer tamper-proof. But as long as MAC prevents attackers from mounting other filesystem over this filesystem, this filesystem can remain tamper-proof. Regards. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
