On 2020-12-12 10:02:48, Tushar Sugandhi wrote:
> System administrators should be able to limit which kernel subsystems
> they want to measure the critical data for. To enable that, an IMA policy
> condition to choose specific kernel subsystems is needed. This policy
> condition would constrain the measurement of the critical data based on
> a label for the given subsystems.
> 
> Add a new IMA policy condition - "data_source:=" to the IMA func
> CRITICAL_DATA to allow measurement of various kernel subsystems. This
> policy condition would enable the system administrators to restrict the
> measurement to the labels listed in "data_source:=".
> 
> Limit the measurement to the labels that are specified in the IMA
> policy - CRITICAL_DATA+"data_source:=". If "data_sources:=" is not
> provided with the func CRITICAL_DATA, the data from all the
> supported kernel subsystems is measured.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusha...@linux.microsoft.com>

Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhi...@linux.microsoft.com>

Tyler

> ---
>  Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy |  2 ++
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c  | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---
>  2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy 
> b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> index 6ec7daa87cba..0f4ee9e0a455 100644
> --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> @@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ Description:
>                       template:= name of a defined IMA template type
>                       (eg, ima-ng). Only valid when action is "measure".
>                       pcr:= decimal value
> +                     data_source:= [label]
> +                     label:= a unique string used for grouping and limiting 
> critical data.
>  
>                 default policy:
>                       # PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c 
> b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index d45c2dbb6d45..fea996a9e26c 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
>  #define IMA_PCR              0x0100
>  #define IMA_FSNAME   0x0200
>  #define IMA_KEYRINGS 0x0400
> +#define IMA_DATA_SOURCE      0x0800
>  
>  #define UNKNOWN              0
>  #define MEASURE              0x0001  /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
> @@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
>       } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
>       char *fsname;
>       struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings; /* Measure keys added to these 
> keyrings */
> +     struct ima_rule_opt_list *data_source; /* Measure data from this source 
> */
>       struct ima_template_desc *template;
>  };
>  
> @@ -480,7 +482,11 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry 
> *rule,
>               opt_list = rule->keyrings;
>               break;
>       case CRITICAL_DATA:
> -             return true;
> +             if (!rule->data_source)
> +                     return true;
> +
> +             opt_list = rule->data_source;
> +             break;
>       default:
>               return false;
>       }
> @@ -925,7 +931,7 @@ enum {
>       Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt,
>       Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag,
>       Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings,
> -     Opt_err
> +     Opt_data_source, Opt_err
>  };
>  
>  static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
> @@ -962,6 +968,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
>       {Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"},
>       {Opt_template, "template=%s"},
>       {Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"},
> +     {Opt_data_source, "data_source=%s"},
>       {Opt_err, NULL}
>  };
>  
> @@ -1129,7 +1136,8 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry 
> *entry)
>               if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
>                       return false;
>  
> -             if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_UID | IMA_PCR))
> +             if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_UID | IMA_PCR |
> +                                  IMA_DATA_SOURCE))
>                       return false;
>  
>               if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
> @@ -1339,6 +1347,23 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct 
> ima_rule_entry *entry)
>  
>                       entry->flags |= IMA_KEYRINGS;
>                       break;
> +             case Opt_data_source:
> +                     ima_log_string(ab, "data_source", args[0].from);
> +
> +                     if (entry->data_source) {
> +                             result = -EINVAL;
> +                             break;
> +                     }
> +
> +                     entry->data_source = ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(args);
> +                     if (IS_ERR(entry->data_source)) {
> +                             result = PTR_ERR(entry->data_source);
> +                             entry->data_source = NULL;
> +                             break;
> +                     }
> +
> +                     entry->flags |= IMA_DATA_SOURCE;
> +                     break;
>               case Opt_fsuuid:
>                       ima_log_string(ab, "fsuuid", args[0].from);
>  
> @@ -1719,6 +1744,12 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
>               seq_puts(m, " ");
>       }
>  
> +     if (entry->flags & IMA_DATA_SOURCE) {
> +             seq_puts(m, "data_source=");
> +             ima_show_rule_opt_list(m, entry->data_source);
> +             seq_puts(m, " ");
> +     }
> +
>       if (entry->flags & IMA_PCR) {
>               snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", entry->pcr);
>               seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_pcr), tbuf);
> -- 
> 2.17.1
> 

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