* Wei Huang (wei.hua...@amd.com) wrote:
> Under the case of nested on nested (e.g. L0->L1->L2->L3), #GP triggered
> by SVM instructions can be hided from L1. Instead the hypervisor can
> inject the proper #VMEXIT to inform L1 of what is happening. Thus L1
> can avoid invoking the #GP workaround. For this reason we turns on
> guest VM's X86_FEATURE_SVME_ADDR_CHK bit for KVM running inside VM to
> receive the notification and change behavior.

Doesn't this mean a VM migrated between levels (hmm L2 to L1???) would
see different behaviour?
(I've never tried such a migration, but I thought in principal it should
work).

Dave


> Co-developed-by: Bandan Das <b...@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Bandan Das <b...@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei.hua...@amd.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
>  1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index 2a12870ac71a..89512c0e7663 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -2196,6 +2196,11 @@ static int svm_instr_opcode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  
>  static int emulate_svm_instr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int opcode)
>  {
> +     const int guest_mode_exit_codes[] = {
> +             [SVM_INSTR_VMRUN] = SVM_EXIT_VMRUN,
> +             [SVM_INSTR_VMLOAD] = SVM_EXIT_VMLOAD,
> +             [SVM_INSTR_VMSAVE] = SVM_EXIT_VMSAVE,
> +     };
>       int (*const svm_instr_handlers[])(struct vcpu_svm *svm) = {
>               [SVM_INSTR_VMRUN] = vmrun_interception,
>               [SVM_INSTR_VMLOAD] = vmload_interception,
> @@ -2203,7 +2208,14 @@ static int emulate_svm_instr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, 
> int opcode)
>       };
>       struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
>  
> -     return svm_instr_handlers[opcode](svm);
> +     if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
> +             svm->vmcb->control.exit_code = guest_mode_exit_codes[opcode];
> +             svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = 0;
> +             svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2 = 0;
> +
> +             return nested_svm_vmexit(svm);
> +     } else
> +             return svm_instr_handlers[opcode](svm);
>  }
>  
>  /*
> @@ -4034,6 +4046,11 @@ static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu 
> *vcpu)
>       /* Check again if INVPCID interception if required */
>       svm_check_invpcid(svm);
>  
> +     if (nested && guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SVM)) {
> +             best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x8000000A, 0);
> +             best->edx |= (1 << 28);
> +     }
> +
>       /* For sev guests, the memory encryption bit is not reserved in CR3.  */
>       if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
>               best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x8000001F, 0);
> -- 
> 2.27.0
> 
-- 
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilb...@redhat.com / Manchester, UK

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