In addition to the pkey check for user pages, advertise pkr_mask also to
cache the conditions where protection key checks for supervisor pages
are needed. Add CR4_PKS in mmu_role_bits to track the pkr_mask update on
a per-mmu basis.

In original cache conditions of pkr_mask, U/S bit in page tables is a
judgement condition and replace the PFEC.RSVD in page fault error code
to form the index of 16 domains. PKS support would extend the U/S bits
(if U/S=0, PKS check required). It adds an additional check for
cr4_pke/cr4_pks to ensure the necessity and distinguish PKU and PKS from
each other.

Signed-off-by: Chenyi Qiang <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 11 +++---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h              | 13 ++++---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c          | 63 +++++++++++++++++++--------------
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              |  3 +-
 4 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 1909d34cbac8..e515f1cecb88 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ union kvm_mmu_extended_role {
                unsigned int cr0_pg:1;
                unsigned int cr4_pae:1;
                unsigned int cr4_pse:1;
-               unsigned int cr4_pke:1;
+               unsigned int cr4_pkr:1;
                unsigned int cr4_smap:1;
                unsigned int cr4_smep:1;
                unsigned int maxphyaddr:6;
@@ -378,10 +378,11 @@ struct kvm_mmu {
        u8 permissions[16];
 
        /*
-       * The pkru_mask indicates if protection key checks are needed.  It
-       * consists of 16 domains indexed by page fault error code bits [4:1],
-       * with PFEC.RSVD replaced by ACC_USER_MASK from the page tables.
-       * Each domain has 2 bits which are ANDed with AD and WD from PKRU.
+       * The pkr_mask indicates if protection key checks are needed.
+       * It consists of 16 domains indexed by page fault error code
+       * bits[4:1] with PFEC.RSVD replaced by ACC_USER_MASK from the
+       * page tables. Each domain has 2 bits which are ANDed with AD
+       * and WD from PKRU/PKRS.
        */
        u32 pkr_mask;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
index a77bd20c83f9..55b71c28e46e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
@@ -192,14 +192,17 @@ static inline u8 permission_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, 
struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
        WARN_ON(pfec & (PFERR_PK_MASK | PFERR_RSVD_MASK));
        if (unlikely(mmu->pkr_mask)) {
                u32 pkr_bits, offset;
+               u64 pkr;
 
                /*
-               * PKRU defines 32 bits, there are 16 domains and 2
-               * attribute bits per domain in pkru.  pte_pkey is the
-               * index of the protection domain, so pte_pkey * 2 is
-               * is the index of the first bit for the domain.
+               * PKRU and PKRS both define 32 bits. There are 16 domains
+               * and 2 attribute bits per domain in them. pte_key is the
+               * index of the protection domain, so pte_pkey * 2 is the
+               * index of the first bit for the domain. The choice of
+               * PKRU and PKRS is determined by the accessed pages.
                */
-               pkr_bits = (vcpu->arch.pkru >> (pte_pkey * 2)) & 3;
+               pkr = pte_access & PT_USER_MASK ? vcpu->arch.pkru : 
vcpu->arch.pkrs;
+               pkr_bits = (pkr >> pte_pkey * 2) & 3;
 
                /* clear present bit, replace PFEC.RSVD with ACC_USER_MASK. */
                offset = (pfec & ~1) +
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index d22c0813e4b9..92b24fa71f93 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -4278,42 +4278,49 @@ static void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu 
*vcpu,
 }
 
 /*
-* PKU is an additional mechanism by which the paging controls access to
-* user-mode addresses based on the value in the PKRU register.  Protection
-* key violations are reported through a bit in the page fault error code.
+* Protection Keys (PKEY) is an additional mechanism by which
+* the paging controls access to user-mode/supervisor-mode address
+* based on the values in PKEY registers (PKRU/PKRS). Protection key
+* violations are reported through a bit in the page fault error code.
 * Unlike other bits of the error code, the PK bit is not known at the
 * call site of e.g. gva_to_gpa; it must be computed directly in
-* permission_fault based on two bits of PKRU, on some machine state (CR4,
-* CR0, EFER, CPL), and on other bits of the error code and the page tables.
+* permission_fault based on two bits of PKRU/PKRS, on some machine
+* state (CR4, CR0, EFER, CPL), and on other bits of the error code
+* and the page tables.
 *
 * In particular the following conditions come from the error code, the
 * page tables and the machine state:
-* - PK is always zero unless CR4.PKE=1 and EFER.LMA=1
+* - PK is always zero unless CR4.PKE=1/CR4.PKS=1 and EFER.LMA=1
 * - PK is always zero if RSVD=1 (reserved bit set) or F=1 (instruction fetch)
-* - PK is always zero if U=0 in the page tables
-* - PKRU.WD is ignored if CR0.WP=0 and the access is a supervisor access.
+* - PK is always zero if
+*       - U=0 in the page tables and CR4.PKS=0
+*       - U=1 in the page tables and CR4.PKU=0
+* - (PKRU/PKRS).WD is ignored if CR0.WP=0 and the access is a supervisor 
access.
 *
-* The PKRU bitmask caches the result of these four conditions.  The error
-* code (minus the P bit) and the page table's U bit form an index into the
-* PKRU bitmask.  Two bits of the PKRU bitmask are then extracted and ANDed
-* with the two bits of the PKRU register corresponding to the protection key.
-* For the first three conditions above the bits will be 00, thus masking
-* away both AD and WD.  For all reads or if the last condition holds, WD
-* only will be masked away.
+* The pkr_mask caches the result of these three conditions. The error
+* code (minus the P bit) and the page table's U bit form an index into
+* the pkr_mask. Two bits of the pkr_mask are then extracted and ANDed with
+* the two bits of the PKEY register corresponding to the protection key.
+* For the first three conditions above the bits will be 00, thus masking away
+* both AD and WD. For all reads or if the last condition holds, WD only will be
+* masked away.
 */
 static void update_pkr_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
                                bool ept)
 {
        unsigned bit;
-       bool wp;
+       bool wp, cr4_pke, cr4_pks;
 
        if (ept) {
                mmu->pkr_mask = 0;
                return;
        }
 
-       /* PKEY is enabled only if CR4.PKE and EFER.LMA are both set. */
-       if (!kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKE) || !is_long_mode(vcpu)) {
+       cr4_pke = kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKE) != 0;
+       cr4_pks = kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKS) != 0;
+
+       /* PKEY is enabled only if CR4.PKE/CR4.PKS and EFER.LMA are both set. */
+       if ((!cr4_pke && !cr4_pks) || !is_long_mode(vcpu)) {
                mmu->pkr_mask = 0;
                return;
        }
@@ -4333,19 +4340,22 @@ static void update_pkr_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, 
struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
                pte_user = pfec & PFERR_RSVD_MASK;
 
                /*
-                * Only need to check the access which is not an
-                * instruction fetch and is to a user page.
+                * need to check the access which is not an
+                * instruction fetch and
+                * - if cr4_pke 1-setting when accessing a user page.
+                * - if cr4_pks 1-setting when accessing a supervisor page.
                 */
-               check_pkey = (!ff && pte_user);
+               check_pkey = !ff && (pte_user ? cr4_pke : cr4_pks);
+
                /*
-                * write access is controlled by PKRU if it is a
-                * user access or CR0.WP = 1.
+                * write access is controlled by PKRU/PKRS if
+                * it is a user access or CR0.WP = 1.
                 */
                check_write = check_pkey && wf && (uf || wp);
 
-               /* PKRU.AD stops both read and write access. */
+               /* PKRU/PKRS.AD stops both read and write access. */
                pkey_bits = !!check_pkey;
-               /* PKRU.WD stops write access. */
+               /* PKRU/PKRS.WD stops write access. */
                pkey_bits |= (!!check_write) << 1;
 
                mmu->pkr_mask |= (pkey_bits & 3) << pfec;
@@ -4427,7 +4437,8 @@ static union kvm_mmu_extended_role 
kvm_calc_mmu_role_ext(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
        ext.cr4_smep = !!kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_SMEP);
        ext.cr4_smap = !!kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_SMAP);
        ext.cr4_pse = !!is_pse(vcpu);
-       ext.cr4_pke = !!kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKE);
+       ext.cr4_pkr = !!kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKE) ||
+                     !!kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKS);
        ext.maxphyaddr = cpuid_maxphyaddr(vcpu);
 
        ext.valid = 1;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 684ef760481c..aec889a4eb66 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -982,7 +982,8 @@ int kvm_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
        unsigned long old_cr4 = kvm_read_cr4(vcpu);
        unsigned long pdptr_bits = X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PSE | X86_CR4_PAE |
                                   X86_CR4_SMEP;
-       unsigned long mmu_role_bits = pdptr_bits | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_PKE;
+       unsigned long mmu_role_bits = pdptr_bits | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_PKE |
+                                     X86_CR4_PKS;
 
        if (kvm_valid_cr4(vcpu, cr4))
                return 1;
-- 
2.17.1

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