On Mon, Mar 08, 2021 at 01:50:57PM +0100, Pavel Machek wrote:
> Hi!
> 
> > commit 3b23a32a63219f51a5298bc55a65ecee866e79d0 upstream.
> > 
> > dev_ifsioc_locked() is called with only RCU read lock, so when
> > there is a parallel writer changing the mac address, it could
> > get a partially updated mac address, as shown below:
> > 
> > Thread 1                    Thread 2
> > // eth_commit_mac_addr_change()
> > memcpy(dev->dev_addr, addr->sa_data, ETH_ALEN);
> >                             // dev_ifsioc_locked()
> >                             memcpy(ifr->ifr_hwaddr.sa_data,
> >                                     dev->dev_addr,...);
> > 
> > Close this race condition by guarding them with a RW semaphore,
> > like netdev_get_name(). We can not use seqlock here as it does not
> 
> I guess it may fix a race, but... does it leak kernel stack data to
> userland?
> 
> 
> > +++ b/drivers/net/tap.c
> > @@ -1093,10 +1093,9 @@ static long tap_ioctl(struct file *file,
> >                     return -ENOLINK;
> >             }
> >             ret = 0;
> > -           u = tap->dev->type;
> > +           dev_get_mac_address(&sa, dev_net(tap->dev), tap->dev->name);
> >             if (copy_to_user(&ifr->ifr_name, tap->dev->name, IFNAMSIZ) ||
> > -               copy_to_user(&ifr->ifr_hwaddr.sa_data, tap->dev->dev_addr, 
> > ETH_ALEN) ||
> > -               put_user(u, &ifr->ifr_hwaddr.sa_family))
> > +               copy_to_user(&ifr->ifr_hwaddr, &sa, sizeof(sa)))
> >                     ret = -EFAULT;
> >             tap_put_tap_dev(tap);
> >             rtnl_unlock();
> 
> We copy whole "struct sockaddr".
> 
> > +int dev_get_mac_address(struct sockaddr *sa, struct net *net, char 
> > *dev_name)
> > +{
> > +   size_t size = sizeof(sa->sa_data);
> > +   struct net_device *dev;
> > +   int ret = 0;
> ...
> > +   if (!dev->addr_len)
> > +           memset(sa->sa_data, 0, size);
> > +   else
> > +           memcpy(sa->sa_data, dev->dev_addr,
> > +                  min_t(size_t, size, dev->addr_len));
> 
> But we only coppied dev->addr_len bytes in.
> 
> This would be very simple way to plug the leak.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek (CIP) <[email protected]>
> 
> diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c
> index 75ca6c6d01d6..b67ff23a1f0d 100644
> --- a/net/core/dev.c
> +++ b/net/core/dev.c
> @@ -8714,11 +8714,9 @@ int dev_get_mac_address(struct sockaddr *sa, struct 
> net *net, char *dev_name)
>               ret = -ENODEV;
>               goto unlock;
>       }
> -     if (!dev->addr_len)
> -             memset(sa->sa_data, 0, size);
> -     else
> -             memcpy(sa->sa_data, dev->dev_addr,
> -                    min_t(size_t, size, dev->addr_len));
> +     memset(sa->sa_data, 0, size);
> +     memcpy(sa->sa_data, dev->dev_addr,
> +            min_t(size_t, size, dev->addr_len));
>       sa->sa_family = dev->type;
>  
>  unlock:
> 

Please submit this change properly to the networking developers, they
are not going to pick anything up this way.

greg k-h

Reply via email to