> -----Original Message-----
> From: Huang, Kai <kai.hu...@intel.com>
> Sent: Thursday, August 14, 2025 12:36 PM
> To: Reshetova, Elena <elena.reshet...@intel.com>; Hansen, Dave
> <dave.han...@intel.com>
> Cc: sea...@google.com; mi...@kernel.org; Scarlata, Vincent R
> <vincent.r.scarl...@intel.com>; x...@kernel.org; jar...@kernel.org;
> Annapurve, Vishal <vannapu...@google.com>; linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org;
> Mallick, Asit K <asit.k.mall...@intel.com>; Aktas, Erdem
> <erdemak...@google.com>; Cai, Chong <cho...@google.com>; Bondarevska,
> Nataliia <bond...@google.com>; linux-...@vger.kernel.org; Raynor, Scott
> <scott.ray...@intel.com>
> Subject: Re: [PATCH v14 4/5] x86/sgx: Implement ENCLS[EUPDATESVN]
> 
> On Thu, 2025-08-14 at 10:34 +0300, Reshetova, Elena wrote:
> > All running enclaves and cryptographic assets (such as internal SGX
> > encryption keys) are assumed to be compromised whenever an SGX-related
> > microcode update occurs. To mitigate this assumed compromise the new
> > supervisor SGX instruction ENCLS[EUPDATESVN] can generate fresh
> > cryptographic assets.
> >
> > Before executing EUPDATESVN, all SGX memory must be marked as unused.
> This
> > requirement ensures that no potentially compromised enclave survives the
> > update and allows the system to safely regenerate cryptographic assets.
> >
> > Add the method to perform ENCLS[EUPDATESVN]. However, until the follow
> up
> > patch that wires calling sgx_update_svn() from sgx_inc_usage_count(), this
> > code is not reachable.
> >
> > Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jar...@kernel.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshet...@intel.com>
> 
> Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.hu...@intel.com>
> 
> >
> > + * Return:
> > + * * %0:           - Success or not supported
> > + * * %-EAGAIN:             - Can be safely retried, failure is due to lack 
> > of
> > + * *                       entropy in RNG
> 
> Nit: if another version is ever needed, I think it would be better to make
> the text vertical aligned w/o the leading '-', i.e.,
> 
>       * %-EAGAIN:     - Can be ....
>                         entropy in RNG.
> 
> .. instead of
> 
>       * %-EAGAIN:     - Can be ....
>                       entropy in RNG.

OK, yes, this can be fixed, indeed. 

Thank you very much for your reviews, Kai!

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