On 3/12/26 6:36 PM, Paolo Abeni wrote:
On 3/10/26 1:39 PM, Nikolay Aleksandrov wrote:
On Tue, Mar 10, 2026 at 01:07:15PM +0100, Eric Dumazet wrote:
On Tue, Mar 10, 2026 at 1:00 PM Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> wrote:
On Tue, Mar 10, 2026 at 12:49 PM Nikolay Aleksandrov
<[email protected]> wrote:
On Mon, Mar 09, 2026 at 11:06:58AM +0800, Jiayuan Chen wrote:
From: Jiayuan Chen <[email protected]>

bond_rr_gen_slave_id() dereferences bond->rr_tx_counter without a NULL
check. rr_tx_counter is a per-CPU counter only allocated in bond_open()
when the bond mode is round-robin. If the bond device was never brought
up, rr_tx_counter remains NULL, causing a null-ptr-deref.

The XDP redirect path can reach this code even when the bond is not up:
bpf_master_redirect_enabled_key is a global static key, so when any bond
device has native XDP attached, the XDP_TX -> xdp_master_redirect()
interception is enabled for all bond slaves system-wide. This allows the
path xdp_master_redirect() -> bond_xdp_get_xmit_slave() ->
bond_xdp_xmit_roundrobin_slave_get() -> bond_rr_gen_slave_id() to be
reached on a bond that was never opened.

Fix this by adding a NULL check with unlikely() in bond_rr_gen_slave_id()
before dereferencing rr_tx_counter. When rr_tx_counter is NULL (bond was
never opened), fall back to get_random_u32() for slave selection. The
allocation in bond_open() is kept, with WRITE_ONCE() added to safely
publish the pointer to the XDP read side. A plain read suffices for the
!bond->rr_tx_counter guard in bond_open() itself, as bond_open() runs
under RTNL lock and is the only writer of rr_tx_counter.

Fixes: 879af96ffd72 ("net, core: Add support for XDP redirection to slave 
device")
Reported-by: [email protected]
Closes: 
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/T/
Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <[email protected]>
---
  drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 9 +++++++--
  1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

This is Jay's patch + the unlikely change, looks good to me.
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
Orthogonal to this patch  :

  get_random_u32() typical cost is around 10 to 20 ns, I really wonder
if this makes sense
for the packets_per_slave == 0 or 1 case to haves this kind of
randomness in the first place.

Perhaps we could use a

static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u32, rr_tx_counter)

And :
  slave_id = this_cpu_inc_return(rr_tx_counter);
I also have mixed feelings about this patch.

We probably should detect that the device is not ready before hitting
something deeper in the stack.

Sure, a NULL deref is avoided, bu what happens next ?

We send a packet while the device is not UP, I am pretty sure this
violates at least some RCU rules in device dismantling.
IIRC when the redirect continues, the packet should get dropped if the device is
not up (checks at a few places), but that's outside of bond's jurisdiction and
after the slave id is needed in xdp master redirect's path unfortunately.
I'm not sure it can reach much further, it just has the master dev's slave id
generation in its path.

In any case we shouldn't crash in the slave id generation in the bonding,
that ndo's only job is to return a slave id.
I'm sorry for the back and forth, but I share Eric's concern. I think
the approach suggested by Daniel:

https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/

or the initial patch form:

https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/T/#m7c67bb12f85bc88d583788fb6e41113c46208ae7

would be better. To respond to old concerns raised there: the check is
IMHO bond-specific, as control moves from the lower interface to the
upper bonding device, and the code is under an RCU critical section, the
device can't go away before the xmit is completed.

/P


Looking at this issue holistically:


1. The XDP layer fix addresses the root cause of the current issue

2. Adding a defensive null check in bond_rr_gen_slave_id() protects
   against buggy callers - whether from XDP or future code paths. This
   aligns with the defense-in-depth principle that Nikolay and Sebastian
   highlighted.

Could we include both in v1? This way, the bond layer is robust regardless

of who calls it, preventing similar crashes from other potential code paths.


Thanks


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