__audit_log_capset() records the effective capability set into the
inheritable field due to a copy-paste error. Every CAPSET audit
record therefore reports cap_pi (process inheritable) with the value
of cap_effective instead of cap_inheritable.
This silently corrupts audit data used for compliance and forensic
analysis: an attacker who modifies inheritable capabilities to
prepare for a privilege-escalating exec would have the change masked
in the audit trail.
The bug has been present since the original introduction of CAPSET
audit records in 2008.
Fixes: e68b75a027bb ("When the capset syscall is used it is not possible for
audit to record the actual capbilities being added/removed. This patch adds a
new record type which emits the target pid and the eff, inh, and perm cap
sets.")
Reviewed-by: Ricardo Robaina <[email protected]>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6
Signed-off-by: Sergio Correia <[email protected]>
---
kernel/auditsc.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index ab54fccba215..abdf8da3be93 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2786,7 +2786,7 @@ void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const
struct cred *old)
context->capset.pid = task_tgid_nr(current);
context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
- context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
+ context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
context->capset.cap.ambient = new->cap_ambient;
context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
--
2.54.0
