From: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> Merge TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR and TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW into TPM_BUF_INVALID, given that they are identical (the only difference being the associated log messages).
In addition, add a missing TPM_BUF_INVALID check to tpm_buf_append_handle() following the pattern from other functions in tpm-buf.c. Message-ID: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <[email protected]> --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c | 10 ++++------ include/linux/tpm.h | 8 +++----- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 6 +++--- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c index 4c4f450630df..61833b4d81f0 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c @@ -103,13 +103,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_length); */ void tpm_buf_append(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u8 *new_data, u16 new_length) { - /* Return silently if overflow has already happened. */ - if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) + if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) return; if ((buf->length + new_length) > PAGE_SIZE) { WARN(1, "tpm_buf: write overflow\n"); - buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW; + buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_INVALID; return; } @@ -176,14 +175,13 @@ static void tpm_buf_read(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset, size_t count, void { off_t next_offset; - /* Return silently if overflow has already happened. */ - if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR) + if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) return; next_offset = *offset + count; if (next_offset > buf->length) { WARN(1, "tpm_buf: read out of boundary\n"); - buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR; + buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_INVALID; return; } diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 3630b2ea6aef..3c6a5bcc138a 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -201,12 +201,10 @@ enum tpm_chip_flags { #define to_tpm_chip(d) container_of(d, struct tpm_chip, dev) enum tpm_buf_flags { - /* the capacity exceeded: */ - TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW = BIT(0), /* TPM2B format: */ - TPM_BUF_TPM2B = BIT(1), - /* read out of boundary: */ - TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR = BIT(2), + TPM_BUF_TPM2B = BIT(0), + /* The buffer is in invalid and unusable state: */ + TPM_BUF_INVALID = BIT(1), }; /* diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 29d79c05ed6b..779a2e66ac20 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, /* creation PCR */ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0); - if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) { + if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) { rc = -E2BIG; tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); goto out; @@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; blob_len = tpm_buf_read_u32(&buf, &offset); - if (blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE || buf.flags & TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR) { + if (blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE || buf.flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) { rc = -E2BIG; goto out; } @@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, tpm_buf_append(&buf, blob, blob_len); - if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) { + if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) { rc = -E2BIG; tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); goto out; -- 2.47.3
