Hi Kees, Thanks for the review! Following Vlastimil and Jarkko's feedback on the key_jar patch, should I send a v2 here as well with similar commit message modification: removing CVE references, dropping the skbuff comparison, and framing it as hardening?
Thanks, Mohammed On Wed, Jun 10, 2026 at 9:45 PM Kees Cook <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Sat, Jun 06, 2026 at 03:25:58PM +0100, Mohammed EL Kadiri wrote: > > The cred_jar slab cache holds struct cred objects, which contain > > process credentials: uid, gid, euid, egid, and capability sets. > > Overwriting any of these fields is sufficient for privilege escalation. > > > > On a default Ubuntu 6.17.0-23-generic system, cred_jar (named "cred" > > in sysfs) has 2 aliases, meaning 2 unrelated object types share its > > slab pages (object_size=184, objs_per_slab=42). > > > > Cross-cache heap exploitation relies on slab cache merging to achieve > > type confusion between unrelated kernel objects. CVE-2022-29582 > > demonstrates this technique: an io_uring use-after-free is leveraged > > across cache boundaries through page-level reallocation, ultimately > > achieving root. struct cred is a primary target in this class of > > attacks due to the direct privilege escalation that results from > > corrupting any of its identity or capability fields. > > > > Add SLAB_NO_MERGE to ensure cred_jar receives dedicated slab pages, > > so that freed credential slots can only be reallocated as struct cred > > objects. The memory overhead is minimal: one struct cred exists per > > task, and with 42 objects per slab page, the cost of dedicated pages > > is negligible. There is zero performance impact on the allocation > > hot path. > > > > This follows the precedent set by skbuff_head_cache (net/core/skbuff.c) > > and key_jar (security/keys/key.c) which use SLAB_NO_MERGE for similar > > isolation requirements. > > > > Signed-off-by: Mohammed EL Kadiri <[email protected]> > > Yes please. :) > > Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]> > > -- > Kees Cook
