On Wed Jul 8, 2026 at 2:09 AM CEST, David Windsor wrote: > Many in-kernel LSMs (SELinux, Smack, IMA) store security labels in > extended attributes. For these LSMs, atomic labeling during inode > creation is critical: if the inode becomes accessible before its xattr > is set, it is briefly unlabeled, which can disrupt LSMs making policy > decisions based on file labels. > > Existing LSMs solve this by setting xattrs directly in the > inode_init_security hook, which runs before the inode becomes > accessible. BPF LSM programs currently lack this capability because > the hook uses an output parameter (xattr_count) that BPF programs > cannot write to, and existing kfuncs like bpf_set_dentry_xattr > require a dentry that isn't available until after the inode is > accessible. > > This series introduces the bpf_init_inode_xattr() kfunc, which takes > the combined inode_init_security xattr context argument and claims a > slot in it via the new security_lsmxattr_add() LSM helper. >
There are various CI failures in newly added tests, I don't think any of them are passing. Please fix before respinning. https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/pull/12730 E.g. both test_init_inode_xattr and test_init_inode_xattr_slot do not have expected results. pw-bot: cr > [...]
