On Wed, Jul 08, 2026 at 10:11:01PM +0800, sun jian wrote:
[...]
> > > @@ -5326,14 +5326,18 @@ static int check_max_stack_depth(struct
> > > bpf_verifier_env *env)
> > > static int __check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> > > const char *buf_info,
> > > const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
> > > - argno_t argno, int off, int size)
> > > + argno_t argno, int off, int size,
> > > + u32 *access_end)
> > > {
> > > + s64 start, var_off;
> > > +
> > > if (off < 0) {
> > > verbose(env,
> > > "%s invalid %s buffer access: off=%d, size=%d\n",
> > > reg_arg_name(env, argno), buf_info, off, size);
> > > return -EACCES;
> > > }
> > > +
> > > if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
> > > char tn_buf[48];
> > >
> > > @@ -5344,6 +5348,29 @@ static int __check_buffer_access(struct
> > > bpf_verifier_env *env,
> > > return -EACCES;
> > > }
> > >
> > > + var_off = (s64)reg->var_off.value;
> > > + if (var_off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || var_off <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
> > > + verbose(env, "%s %s buffer offset %lld is not allowed\n",
> > > + reg_arg_name(env, argno), buf_info, var_off);
> > > + return -EACCES;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + start = var_off + off;
> > > + if (start < 0) {
> > > + verbose(env,
> > > + "%s invalid negative %s buffer offset: off=%d,
> > > var_off=%lld\n",
> > > + reg_arg_name(env, argno), buf_info, off, var_off);
> > > + return -EACCES;
> > > + }
> >
> > I was thinking of suggest to just do a single unsigned check
> >
> > var_off = reg->var_off.value;
> > if (var_off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
> > ...
> >
> > But looking at the code before 022ac0750883, what you have is closer
> > aligned to the previous behavior, let's stick to this.
Actually looking again at 022ac0750883, moving the `off < 0` after
tnum_is_const() and bringing back the `off += reg->off` removed from
check_mem_access() is perhaps the more faithful restoration of the
original behavior.
Though reg->off no longer exists, we have to use reg->var_off.value
instead. IIUC any register of pointer type should already have its
var_off bounded to +-BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF by adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() in
theory, and thus shouldn't overflow `int off`.
See the diff below.
[...]
> I agree that the size check is redundant given the current call path. I’ll
> leave
> v4 as-is for now to avoid another respin unless maintainers prefer dropping it
> or adding a short comment around the access_end calculation.
Agree and make sense. Let's see what @Eduard thinks.
---
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index d46f7db20d8f..e116b33ad83e 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -5359,12 +5359,6 @@ static int __check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env
*env,
const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
argno_t argno, int off, int size)
{
- if (off < 0) {
- verbose(env,
- "%s invalid %s buffer access: off=%d, size=%d\n",
- reg_arg_name(env, argno), buf_info, off, size);
- return -EACCES;
- }
if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
char tn_buf[48];
@@ -5375,6 +5369,14 @@ static int __check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env
*env,
return -EACCES;
}
+ off += reg->var_off.value;
+ if (off < 0) {
+ verbose(env,
+ "%s invalid %s buffer access: off=%d, size=%d\n",
+ reg_arg_name(env, argno), buf_info, off, size);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
return 0;
}