When an async decrypt fails, tls_decrypt_done() records the error in
ctx->async_wait.err and calls tls_err_abort(), which stores it in
sk_err. tls_sw_recvmsg() and tls_sw_read_sock() each read
async_wait.err once they hold the reader lock and fail the call: a
record that did not authenticate breaks the connection.
tls_sw_splice_read() has no such check, and sk_err does not stand in
for one. tls_rx_rec_wait() tests sk_err only inside the loop it
skips whenever a record is already parsed, and the first reader to
reach sock_error() clears it, while async_wait.err persists. A
splice therefore keeps delivering records on a connection that
recvmsg() and read_sock() refuse to read.
Read async_wait.err in tls_sw_splice_read() as the other two readers
do.
Fixes: f314bfee81b1 ("tls: rx: return the already-copied data on crypto error")
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <[email protected]>
---
net/tls/tls_sw.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
index 62d46736e24b..d1ad31986cf2 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
@@ -2014,6 +2014,11 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock, loff_t
*ppos,
if (err < 0)
return err;
+ /* If crypto failed the connection is broken */
+ err = ctx->async_wait.err;
+ if (err)
+ goto splice_read_end;
+
if (!skb_queue_empty(&ctx->rx_list)) {
skb = __skb_dequeue(&ctx->rx_list);
} else {
--
2.54.0
