On Tue, Sep 01, 2026 at 09:11:32PM +0530, Srish Srinivasan wrote:
> The trusted_key_options struct contains TPM-specific fields (keyhandle,
> keyauth, blobauth_len, blobauth, pcrinfo_len, pcrinfo, pcrlock, hash,
> policydigest_len, policydigest, and policyhandle). This leads to the
> accumulation of backend-specific fields in the generic options structure.
>
> Define struct trusted_key_tpm and move the TPM-specific fields there. Store
> a pointer to it in the private member of struct trusted_key_options.
>
> No functional change intended.
>
> Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
> ---
> Changelog:
>
> v5:
> - Rename struct trusted_tpm_options to struct trusted_key_tpm, as suggested
> by Jarkko.
>
> v4:
> - Rebased onto mainline after tpm-buf memory-safe allocation changes were
> merged
> - Resolved the resulting merge conflicts
>
> v3:
> - Exclude the preparatory clean up patch as the problem has been addressed
> in commit 9ec4175a30eb ("KEYS: trusted: Debugging as a feature")
>
> v2:
> - Exclude the bug-fix patch as it has already been applied to 6.19-rc7
> - Rename instances of trusted_tpm_options from tpm_opts to private
> - Use pr_debug and KERN_DEBUG for logging debug messages (preparatory clean
> up patch)
> - Address other minor comments from Jarkko
>
> include/keys/trusted-type.h | 11 ---
> include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 14 ++++
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 96 ++++++++++++++---------
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 50 ++++++------
> 4 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
> index 9f9940482da4..3db61b57cf73 100644
> --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h
> +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
> @@ -39,17 +39,6 @@ struct trusted_key_payload {
>
> struct trusted_key_options {
> uint16_t keytype;
> - uint32_t keyhandle;
> - unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
> - uint32_t blobauth_len;
> - unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
> - uint32_t pcrinfo_len;
> - unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
> - int pcrlock;
> - uint32_t hash;
> - uint32_t policydigest_len;
> - unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
> - uint32_t policyhandle;
> void *private;
> };
>
> diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
> index 3a0fa3bc8454..dafbd4a84ddd 100644
> --- a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
> +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
> @@ -6,6 +6,20 @@
>
> extern struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops;
>
> +struct trusted_key_tpm {
> + uint32_t keyhandle;
> + unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
> + uint32_t blobauth_len;
> + unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
> + uint32_t pcrinfo_len;
> + unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
> + int pcrlock;
> + uint32_t hash;
> + uint32_t policydigest_len;
> + unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
> + uint32_t policyhandle;
> +};
> +
> int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> struct trusted_key_options *options);
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> index bf0bf7f36970..d396f4267180 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> @@ -48,15 +48,17 @@ enum {
> #ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
> static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
> {
> + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = o->private;
> +
> if (!trusted_debug)
> return;
>
> pr_debug("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
> - pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
> - pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
> - pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
> + pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", private->keyhandle);
> + pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", private->pcrlock);
> + pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", private->pcrinfo_len);
> print_hex_dump_debug("pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
> - 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
> + 16, 1, private->pcrinfo, private->pcrinfo_len, 0);
> }
>
> static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
> @@ -626,6 +628,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
> static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
> struct trusted_key_options *o)
> {
> + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = o->private;
> int ret;
>
> struct tpm_buf *tb __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
> @@ -637,9 +640,10 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
> /* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */
> p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable;
>
> - ret = tpm_seal(tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth,
> + ret = tpm_seal(tb, o->keytype, private->keyhandle, private->keyauth,
> p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len,
> - o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len);
> + private->blobauth, private->pcrinfo,
> + private->pcrinfo_len);
> if (ret < 0)
> pr_info("srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
>
> @@ -652,6 +656,7 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
> static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
> struct trusted_key_options *o)
> {
> + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = o->private;
> int ret;
>
> struct tpm_buf *tb __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
> @@ -660,8 +665,8 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
>
> tpm_buf_init(tb, TPM_BUFSIZE);
>
> - ret = tpm_unseal(tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len,
> - o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);
> + ret = tpm_unseal(tb, private->keyhandle, private->keyauth, p->blob,
> + p->blob_len, private->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);
> if (ret < 0)
> pr_info("srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
> else
> @@ -697,6 +702,7 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
> static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
> struct trusted_key_options *opt)
> {
> + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = opt->private;
> substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
> char *p = c;
> int token;
> @@ -712,7 +718,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload
> *pay,
> if (tpm2 < 0)
> return tpm2;
>
> - opt->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
> + private->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
>
> if (!c)
> return 0;
> @@ -726,11 +732,11 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct
> trusted_key_payload *pay,
>
> switch (token) {
> case Opt_pcrinfo:
> - opt->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2;
> - if (opt->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE)
> + private->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2;
> + if (private->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE)
> return -EINVAL;
> - res = hex2bin(opt->pcrinfo, args[0].from,
> - opt->pcrinfo_len);
> + res = hex2bin(private->pcrinfo, args[0].from,
> + private->pcrinfo_len);
> if (res < 0)
> return -EINVAL;
> break;
> @@ -739,12 +745,12 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct
> trusted_key_payload *pay,
> if (res < 0)
> return -EINVAL;
> opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype;
> - opt->keyhandle = handle;
> + private->keyhandle = handle;
> break;
> case Opt_keyauth:
> if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
> return -EINVAL;
> - res = hex2bin(opt->keyauth, args[0].from,
> + res = hex2bin(private->keyauth, args[0].from,
> SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
> if (res < 0)
> return -EINVAL;
> @@ -755,21 +761,23 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct
> trusted_key_payload *pay,
> * hex strings. TPM 2.0 authorizations are simple
> * passwords (although it can take a hash as well)
> */
> - opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from);
> + private->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from);
>
> - if (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {
> - res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
> + if (private->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {
> + res = hex2bin(private->blobauth, args[0].from,
> TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
> if (res < 0)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> - opt->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE;
> + private->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE;
> break;
> }
>
> - if (tpm2 && opt->blobauth_len <= sizeof(opt->blobauth))
> {
> - memcpy(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
> - opt->blobauth_len);
> + if (tpm2 &&
> + private->blobauth_len <=
> + sizeof(private->blobauth)) {
> + memcpy(private->blobauth, args[0].from,
> + private->blobauth_len);
> break;
> }
>
> @@ -787,14 +795,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct
> trusted_key_payload *pay,
> res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock);
> if (res < 0)
> return -EINVAL;
> - opt->pcrlock = lock;
> + private->pcrlock = lock;
> break;
> case Opt_hash:
> if (test_bit(Opt_policydigest, &token_mask))
> return -EINVAL;
> for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) {
> if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) {
> - opt->hash = i;
> + private->hash = i;
> break;
> }
> }
> @@ -806,14 +814,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct
> trusted_key_payload *pay,
> }
> break;
> case Opt_policydigest:
> - digest_len = hash_digest_size[opt->hash];
> + digest_len = hash_digest_size[private->hash];
> if (!tpm2 || strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * digest_len))
> return -EINVAL;
> - res = hex2bin(opt->policydigest, args[0].from,
> + res = hex2bin(private->policydigest, args[0].from,
> digest_len);
> if (res < 0)
> return -EINVAL;
> - opt->policydigest_len = digest_len;
> + private->policydigest_len = digest_len;
> break;
> case Opt_policyhandle:
> if (!tpm2)
> @@ -821,7 +829,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload
> *pay,
> res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle);
> if (res < 0)
> return -EINVAL;
> - opt->policyhandle = handle;
> + private->policyhandle = handle;
> break;
> default:
> return -EINVAL;
> @@ -832,6 +840,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload
> *pay,
>
> static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
> {
> + struct trusted_key_tpm *private;
> struct trusted_key_options *options;
> int tpm2;
>
> @@ -844,14 +853,22 @@ static struct trusted_key_options
> *trusted_options_alloc(void)
> /* set any non-zero defaults */
> options->keytype = SRK_keytype;
>
> - if (!tpm2)
> - options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
> + private = kzalloc_obj(*private);
> + if (!private) {
> + kfree_sensitive(options);
> + options = NULL;
> + } else {
> + if (!tpm2)
> + private->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
> + options->private = private;
> + }
> }
> return options;
> }
>
> static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
> {
> + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = NULL;
> struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
It would be leaner if you did:
struct trusted_key_options *options __free(kfree_sensitive) = NULL;
Then you can just return instead of jumping to "out".
Applies also to trusted_tpm_unseal at least.
> int ret = 0;
> int tpm2;
> @@ -869,7 +886,8 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload
> *p, char *datablob)
> goto out;
> dump_options(options);
>
> - if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
> + private = options->private;
> + if (!private->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
> ret = -EINVAL;
> goto out;
> }
> @@ -883,20 +901,23 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload
> *p, char *datablob)
> goto out;
> }
>
> - if (options->pcrlock) {
> - ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
> + if (private->pcrlock) {
> + ret = pcrlock(private->pcrlock);
> if (ret < 0) {
> pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
> goto out;
> }
> }
> out:
> + if (options)
> + kfree_sensitive(options->private);
> kfree_sensitive(options);
> return ret;
> }
>
> static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
> {
> + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = NULL;
> struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
> int ret = 0;
> int tpm2;
> @@ -914,7 +935,8 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload
> *p, char *datablob)
> goto out;
> dump_options(options);
>
> - if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
> + private = options->private;
> + if (!private->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
> ret = -EINVAL;
> goto out;
> }
> @@ -926,14 +948,16 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct
> trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
> if (ret < 0)
> pr_info("key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
>
> - if (options->pcrlock) {
> - ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
> + if (private->pcrlock) {
> + ret = pcrlock(private->pcrlock);
> if (ret < 0) {
> pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
> goto out;
> }
> }
> out:
> + if (options)
> + kfree_sensitive(options->private);
> kfree_sensitive(options);
> return ret;
> }
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> index 67225dd562a9..29da1a3328ef 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload
> *payload,
> struct trusted_key_options *options,
> u8 *src, u32 len)
> {
> + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private;
> const int SCRATCH_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE;
> u8 *scratch = kmalloc(SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
> u8 *work = scratch, *work1;
> @@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload
> *payload,
> work = asn1_encode_oid(work, end_work, tpm2key_oid,
> asn1_oid_len(tpm2key_oid));
>
> - if (options->blobauth_len == 0) {
> + if (private->blobauth_len == 0) {
> unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool;
> /* tag 0 is emptyAuth */
> w = asn1_encode_boolean(w, w + sizeof(bool), true);
> @@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload
> *payload,
> goto err;
> }
>
> - work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle);
> + work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, private->keyhandle);
> work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len);
> work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, priv, priv_len);
>
> @@ -101,6 +102,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload
> *payload,
> struct trusted_key_options *options,
> u8 **buf)
> {
> + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private;
> int ret;
> struct tpm2_key_context ctx;
> u8 *blob;
> @@ -120,7 +122,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload
> *payload,
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> *buf = blob;
> - options->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
> + private->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
>
> memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len);
> blob += ctx.priv_len;
> @@ -232,6 +234,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> struct trusted_key_options *options)
> {
> + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private;
> off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
> struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL;
> struct tpm_buf *sized __free(kfree) = NULL;
> @@ -240,11 +243,11 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> u32 flags;
> int rc;
>
> - hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(options->hash);
> + hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(private->hash);
> if (hash < 0)
> return hash;
>
> - if (!options->keyhandle)
> + if (!private->keyhandle)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
> @@ -274,18 +277,18 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>
> tpm_buf_init_sized(sized, TPM_BUFSIZE);
>
> - rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
> + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, private->keyhandle, NULL);
> if (rc)
> goto out;
>
> tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT,
> - options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
> + private->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
>
> /* sensitive */
> - tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, options->blobauth_len);
> + tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, private->blobauth_len);
>
> - if (options->blobauth_len)
> - tpm_buf_append(sized, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
> + if (private->blobauth_len)
> + tpm_buf_append(sized, private->blobauth, private->blobauth_len);
>
> tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, payload->key_len);
> tpm_buf_append(sized, payload->key, payload->key_len);
> @@ -298,14 +301,15 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>
> /* key properties */
> flags = 0;
> - flags |= options->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
> + flags |= private->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
> flags |= payload->migratable ? 0 : (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM |
> TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT);
> tpm_buf_append_u32(sized, flags);
>
> /* policy */
> - tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, options->policydigest_len);
> - if (options->policydigest_len)
> - tpm_buf_append(sized, options->policydigest,
> options->policydigest_len);
> + tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, private->policydigest_len);
> + if (private->policydigest_len)
> + tpm_buf_append(sized, private->policydigest,
> + private->policydigest_len);
>
> /* public parameters */
> tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, TPM_ALG_NULL);
> @@ -376,6 +380,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> u32 *blob_handle)
> {
> u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL;
> + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private;
> struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL;
> unsigned int private_len;
> unsigned int public_len;
> @@ -395,7 +400,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> }
>
> /* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */
> - if (!options->keyhandle)
> + if (!private->keyhandle)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> /* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */
> @@ -439,11 +444,11 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
> tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD);
>
> - rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
> + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, private->keyhandle, NULL);
> if (rc)
> return rc;
>
> - tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, 0, options->keyauth,
> + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, 0, private->keyauth,
> TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
>
> tpm_buf_append(buf, blob, blob_len);
> @@ -483,6 +488,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> struct trusted_key_options *options,
> u32 blob_handle)
> {
> + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private;
> struct tpm_header *head;
> struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL;
> u16 data_len;
> @@ -507,10 +513,10 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> if (rc)
> return rc;
>
> - if (!options->policyhandle) {
> + if (!private->policyhandle) {
> tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT,
> - options->blobauth,
> - options->blobauth_len);
> + private->blobauth,
> + private->blobauth_len);
> } else {
> /*
> * FIXME: The policy session was generated outside the
> @@ -523,9 +529,9 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> * could repeat our actions with the exfiltrated
> * password.
> */
> - tpm2_buf_append_auth(buf, options->policyhandle,
> + tpm2_buf_append_auth(buf, private->policyhandle,
> NULL /* nonce */, 0, 0,
> - options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
> + private->blobauth, private->blobauth_len);
> if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
> tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT,
> NULL, 0);
> --
> 2.53.0
>
BR, Jarkko
