On 9/2/26 4:01 PM, Srish Srinivasan wrote:
trusted_tpm_unseal() proceeds to pcrlock() when the TPM unseal operation
fails. If pcrlock() succeeds, its return value overwrites the unseal error,
causing key instantiation to succeed.
Return immediately when unseal fails to preserve the original error.
Fixes: 5d0682be3189 ("KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <[email protected]>
---
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
index bf0bf7f36970..1168ca235205 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
@@ -923,8 +923,10 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload
*p, char *datablob)
ret = tpm2_unseal_trusted(chip, p, options);
else
ret = key_unseal(p, options);
- if (ret < 0)
+ if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ return ret;
This should be "goto out;"
will fix this in my next version
+ }
if (options->pcrlock) {
ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
